Blog about The HAITI.2 MOVEMENT & JUSTIMA's 21st century-style New Politics for HAITI

For Renewing the Haitian Political Personnel so Advancers now lead Decliners.

Welcome to the Blog where you can hear from me directly. Make yourself at home.

Bienvenue sur le Blog où je peux tout vous exposer directement. Faîtes comme chez vous.

Byenvini sou Blog la. Ou Lakay ou. Mete-w Alèz.

Bienvenido. Mi casa es su casa.

About Me

My photo
La Vallée-Jacmel, Plateau Central et Port-au-Prince (Cité Soleil), Haiti
Qui est Justima?: Un homme qui voit le côté positif des choses et qui part en guerre contre l'idée fataliste qu'Haïti qui est sans cesse dans une descente et chute libre mystiques depuis 200 ans ne se resaisira pas dans les 5 prochaines années pour commencer à réussir une ascencion matérielle et mentale qui va étonner le monde. Un homme de croyances profondes et de principes qui part en guerre contre notre instabilité politico-sociale chronique, désordre institutionnel systémique généralisé, dysfonctionnement économique total et qui dit qu'Haïti a besoin d'un pouvoir volontariste fort pour combler le retard et le mal-developpement de plus de 200 ans. Un homme de famille qui croit que si le plus petit noyau d'Haïtiens qui est la famille connaisse un renouveau et re-apprenne à tisser entre ses membres des liens de confiance et de constance solides et durables ceci refairait fractalement la société haïtienne et le tissu social haïtien et augmenterait exponentiellement le capital social sur lequel on doit lever une nouvelle nation. Un homme qui adore chanter, danser, faire à manger, voyager et qui adore aimer. Justima est le second plus jeune ancien Candidat à la Présidence d'Haiti.

Saturday, August 25, 2007

My Ambition for my country Haiti: A gigantic nation-building

I want to take my country to a final run at glory, so Haitian-born stars can pe proud of it, so Haitian-born high achievers around the world can be proud of it, so black people stop wishing it wasn't there stigmatizing the whole race as a pariah nation, so my fellow average Haitians can finally have more than enough at home, after 200 years of misery, and can start acting truly as the co-masters of the common domain and of the common motherland that they are and start enjoying the country, enjoying a quality of life in elevation, enjoying the miracle of the modern times, Haiti finding again its past splendor.
Bring it on that challenge of nation-building and let me show you there is no task to heavy for the true patriot, for the truly Haitian-at-heart.
I am ready to lead.

It is high time that we try something else, something authentically new, after we have tried at length wholesale despair, misery, negative growth and dysfunctionality. It is high time we give the builders, the shakers, the movers, a chance.
We have tried destruction enough. Let's try construction.
I am ready to lead, if even one Haitian is ready to follow. The others will jump on the bandwagon along the way.
I am ready to lead like a soldier who has heard a clarion call.
It is high time for my country to become that gigantic worksite, that gigantic "chantier", that other Haiti promised to us by all the political upheavals since 1806, that "Haiti.2".
I am ready to show my generation how to answer the call of history that beckons us, for all our personal academic and financial achievements, to dare tackle collectively the greatest challenge of all, nation-building, which surely would turn us into the greatest generation of Haitians since the first generation of 1803 that made 1804.

JUSTIMA, Emmanuel

Monday, July 30, 2007

Restructuring Haiti: Justima's Ambitions of Re-structuring the State of Haiti, top to bottom, so it can tackle real nation-building of the New Haiti

Nation-Building is no Picnic
Re-structuring a country that is 200 years behind any form of civilisation is not rocket science. But it is still an offly complicated thing to make happen when you don't have the luxury to build it over another 200 years when you can take your sweet time to take things and assemble them piece by piece. To turn the whole thing around over a definite horizon of 2 to 3 decades when you are there to conduct it with the same strong-willed, talented and energized men and women backed by a lot of money and technology on the ground, you have to choregraph a set of complex moves that must be executed together, you have to interweave various sets of complex leadership acts that must react with and interpenetrate each other and the effects of each set and combined sets must multiply themselves suddenly, fractally, rapidly, to pull back up, in giant moves after giants moves and out of the grips of the several combining divergent forces, all that was pulling the country down. Putting together such a pressure cooker is no picnic.

The 2 Forces in Haiti and about Haiti that are Pulling us Down
And the manifestations of these forces, that we just spoke of, are congregating themselves into the 2 huges forces in Haiti and about Haiti that are clashing while we and the country are all immobilized.

1- The first group of these two converging divergent forces says: Make their misery more bearable on their way down, make it less painful for them, more humane for them. Run to help them with bringing them food and medicines and emergency makeshift housing, makeshift running water, makeshift roads, etc. Give them all emergency things they need on their way down and let them drown, they will drown, it's over platform. Stay close enough but stay away enough for them not to pull us the rescuers down with them. The sooner we realize that, we can cut our losses. It will never change or be any better. It is the way of Haiti. It its gravity doing its thing, because what it will take to get them across is too huge, the cost is too huge.

2- The second group these converging divergent forces says: Well rather than drowning or before we drown, we will seize your boat that is taking you to safe harbor and we hold on to it. We will hold on to your foot to gather strength and have a chance to save our skin even though that might endanger us all platform.

The Powerful 3rd Force and Strange Attractor for These 2 Forces that We Must Build
Both set of these 2 huges converging forces in Haiti and about Haiti are wrong and they know it. It is simply the best they've got. How about building a third platform as a powerful strange attractor for these first 2forces, make a deal with all, that all consent to pay for whatever it takes, and let us do whatever we must do to pay back if we use our connections to get us all a lifeline and a raft that lift us all across at whatever the cost? It is that which has never been tried and which is a win/win. We must build that 3rd huge force and platform if there must be any restructuring for any nation building at all and it is what I am trying to implant in the country and to coordinate outside Haiti. Otherwise we are trapped.

Otherwise We Will Remain Trapped
About 10 millions of us will remain trapped:

1) without ever a chance, in mass, to get the advanced knowledge, education and re-education, attidude and skills and habits we each need to be able to do something useful and fruitful for ourselves and for the nation, so we do not keep on killing its chances for advancement in threatening to have it run over completely by the pulling down of our negative forces that swirl over the country, we will not go anywhere;

2) without a chance ever, in mass, to get the advanced tools we each need to retool and use our advanced education to make things as efficiently and as precisely world-class like the same way as any other more advanced nations so this advanced retooling makes us and our country make money, we are not going anywhere;

3) without ever a chance, in mass, for all of us who are being wasted because the country is a wasteland without viable business activities and without us, who are using only 10 to 15% of our total capacity and of what we each could have done, having ever the chance to start harnessing and mining the boundless opportunities of a country that has not been built for 200 years and that can create anything from scratch and greenfield anything and raise anything and build anything over the land, we are going anywhere;

4) without a chance ever, in mass, for the connections to get the broad adequate capitalization, the broad adequate credit financing and capital we would each need to adequately and broadly fund any pursuit of such opportunities and make them stick rather than just sitting and contemplating them and what we could have done, we are not going anywhere;

5) without ever a chance, in mass, for each of us to be able to count on all the requisite critical infrastructures to power what we are doing, the mass transit road systems, railroad trains systems, huge ferry and ports and airports systems, etc. to move the vast array of people and of materials it takes to help us make any of this a reality, we are not going anywhere;

We are trapped and possibly for ever, as the world has its own problem and is leaving us behind and caught up in these webs of forces. The time to un-trapped Haiti and ourselves and build a post-now era is now or never.

Time to Un-trapped, The Way to Un-Trapped and The Way Forward
It is therefore legitimate that you should look for a post Aristide/post Preval era, one that even Aristide and Preval called for in their own kind of way, one that equally the businessman Andre Apaid and his "184" bourgeois-led insurrection movement" called for, one that would be soon in Haiti and that can finally land the many mass movements that the Haitian population has been spurring up, in vain for a re-direction, a re-start, a new "depart", a period of "re"-construction, of nation-building. But this will come about only with the levy of a new, fresh, distributed leadership that has broad based support both in Haiti and outside Haiti. Such a fresh leadership cannot be parachuted each 2 to 3 months before an election. Any such sudden genius will degenerate as you know. Instead, such fresh and new leadership for a fresh start that all can believe in, in Haiti and outside Haiti, must be worked on 2 to 3 years before and developed with all who cares. We think you do and that you have a great stake in the outcome of any new movement in our country. Therefore let us share with you what I, Emmanuel Justima as the young aspirant Leader of our country, was entrusted upon to come up with, the shared vision of the way forward on how best to bring in new leadership and new acts of leadership for a new era in our country.

My Justima's shared vision uses a very simple common sense approach. It says if you keep on reaching in the same pool that we have been reaching in, in over 200 years, to find those to lead the country, you'll definitely pick the same kind of people from whom you cannot expect something different. In other to increase your chance of something new being done and taking hold, you have to reach in a different pool of people or mix things up tremendously in the pool you've got. You have to have some new people at it in Haiti, if Haiti is to be finally seriously transformed. Einstein says it best, you cannot solve problems like these seeing them with the same eyes that have created them or that have coped with them. You need fresh pair of eyes that can figure out in what they see all the various fresh ways these problems can be overcome. To put ist simply: You need new People.

The Personnel Element in the Multi-Aspects of What We Must Put Together
By virtue of what I explained above as nation-building being very dynamic, very fluid and very complex, any nation building in our country will be, out of necessity, a multi-locations, a multi-sites, a multi-focused in multi-domains, therefore will be multi-plans simultaneously that shall require a great variety of cross-functional teams of mostly new people, with the requisite skills, working in tandem in unisom. You must have this at the basis of all that must happen in Haiti. You cannot overstate these human elements enough.

It is facing the issue of the personnel before task and performance. It is what all great theory of change and transformation calls for. It is the central and primordial issue of having first credible and capable men and of women rising together and acting together to spur a quantum leap growth and development of all in the country, instead of the traditional slow under-developers even though they have good intentions, instead of triumphing ignorants and thuggs and private plunderers of the common good. It is about the simultaneous rise of the rest of us, men and women together, to own up the life-altering, the life-transforming moves our desperate situation calls for, so we can unstuck ourselves for good.

Who will Make it Happen if Not People and Teams First Before Concentrating on Tasks and Performance?
You must have surge after surge of these multi-groups and of these multi-teams of truly committed Haitians if we have to shake up and dislodge anything out. And you must have specially leading these surges, or primarily as the majority and as the strongest contingent of these surges, those whom we never gave a chance to try and who don't care about politics but about getting it done, at last, and who can credibilize the whole Haitian experience again.

You cannot keep on banking on finding a lone savior for the nation, a lone sharp shooter whom we charge to shoot down all the ills of the country on our behalf, while we watch and wait to enjoy. You have to seek an entire orchestra of dedicated, talented musical players who can play in innovative ways, who can play each one the partition of a new song and who play together in harmony not in cacophony. And you have to seek a symphony we all agree on and we are all excited about and a conductor who unites and inspires both the individual achievements and the collective triumphs in the magistral collective delivery of that symphony for glory and profit of community and country.

New times demand new strategy: leaders of men, leaders of teams rather than just charismatic leaders. It is said below what kind of Leaders of men, what kind of Leaders of teams I, Justima, see Haiti needs right now and in what optimal configuration I think we should bring them in to ensure our nation survives as one, mass-advances as one, and accomplishes as one, and this is the mass-advancements criteria, a complete turn around on those 5 mass areas we described above at the beginning. Otherwise we would all be trapped on for a long while.

In what is crafted as Justima'shared new vision of the way forward for Haiti, for a new country, we know it is easier for us to want to do what is well-known and to be tempted to do what other countries are doing even though when they chose to do so the first time, they picked what was best and would be best for them based on where they were at. The vision for a Haiti.2, for a nation that performs and delivers for all at a higher level now in every area as a nation where we feed ourselves, fuel ourselves and lift ourselves up at any level we want, is a vision that calls on us to dare and be bold when we try. We cannot just want to replace those who had hijacked the country for themselves but play it safe and be timid in what we offer as new, in the face of the great devastation we find ourselves in today, in every area.

The idea that we want change but that we lack the stamina or stomach or will or wit or skill to impose change on the ground, to deliver the goods that they will not deliver, to tackle the dimensions of it that they would not tackle, to show the higher respect for country and countrymens and do better in everything, to reach for higher and with consistency, to push for broader and deeper, to run harder and to go farther, and to demand finally excellence in performance and in results, for community and country, would be ludicrous if we did lack that stamina and would make us lose face in the face of those very people we sought to replace. If we are not going to do better we should not even try, as they are better than us at running the status quo. If we are going to try, says Justima, what is right, we should keep right and what is wrong, we should make right in Haiti.

The Re-Structuring Vision
Here is how we should organize the top new leadership of our country, which calls for a new ticket of a President and a Vice-President and Central National Prime Minister as well as for 3 new Regional Vice-Prime Ministers, a General-Commander of a new Citizen-soldiers National Guard, and a new National Reserve and Treasury Chairman:

Click on the Picture to see better the file


We know most people may have caught in the vision, of the top new leadership for nation-building in Haiti, our idea of a top new national leader as The General Commander of the Citizen-Soldiers National 3-Guard Forces. Here is the rationale for that. You have to weave as one unit top accountable national leaders 1) for how it is happening in the unfolding of the voluntary vision, 2) for keeping the commitments over time and on the ground nationally, 3) for the execution throughout each of the 3 regions by someone not just with the responsibility but with authority, 4) for how the money we borrowed and that we are massively injecting circulates and is not remaining glued as it makes its way down in any corrupt sticky fingers, 5) and have around that group of top united and disciplined people, a top responsible accountable professional executive commander, to work under the Commander in Chief, to help guard it all and to secure all that's at stakes in that massive national push.

And yes, we did not say frontally a regular army. The mission of a regular army is not what we want to assign to these armed forces for a nation in motion. Rather, it is in the pure historical tradition of Haiti that its Armed Forces be a sort of National Guard constituted essentially of citizens soldiers but with true professionals at its core. Dessalines, the Haitian version of General Washington, the Fore-Father of Haiti's Independence, said: "Au premier coup de canon, les villes disparaissent, mais la nation est debout " (At the first canon firing, the cities fall but the nation stands)". And indeed, the nation stood in 1803 and rendered 1804 possible. It was a citizens' soldiers army.

In this Justima's shared vision for a new country, we seek to levy the new force on that model. I seek to create 3 equally-balanced citizens national guard forces that have each, both a stand alone engagement capability and a collective engagement capability, with each standing autonomously with a precise different mission and commanded interdependently by a top brass through The General-Commander of the United Forces who operates under strict direct orders of the President.

The 3 new forces would be:

1) An Anti-Insurgents & Anti-Trafficking Air-Guard Force

2) An Anti-Gangs Land & Border-Guard Force

3) An Anti-Terror & Anti Commercial Smuggling Coast Guard Force

Haiti needs to be pacified and stabilized in a definitive way, once for all, and to be pacified by Haitian hands. We must own up our perennial instability problem and learn to establish a definitive and lasting efficient and clean security apparatus that gets the job done, on our own. There is no secret in making cola. Get the best and brightest of Haiti into 49 geographically well-dispersed 600-members strong, cells-like type of forces, of highly trained (including sensitivy training in seeing the population as the owners of the force that the force works for and is sworn in to protect) and of highly equipped 49 stand alone units that are strategically positioned in our 49 new geographical communities that we will develop the country around, so each such 49 units of 600 members strong can be, at any moment, anywhere we need to, within our territorial limits, and where each can shut down and control any part of the country within 1 hour. That is what the Justima's shared vision proposes, as a result of our top consultations with military brass, Haitians and non-Haitians alike.

My point is simple: if real nation-building is going to have to be secured in multi-locations at the same time, then you would have to use a broad-banding approach to make things more manageable : banding everything in Haiti around 3 broad concentrated regions in order to forge ahead in an optimal organized way.

The Organized Way: Divisions of the Country that Makes Sense and Devolution of Power

T00 many geographical and political divisions, like the 10 departments Haiti has right now or the equivalents of 10 states for a little island just twice as big as Long Island in New-York. It is , is anarchic the way it is (too many chiefs not enough Indians) and the way of the world is consolidation, even in France where we imported that concept of departments, the French are re-organizing to replace many of their departments. Nothing is get done in the world these days anyway without such meaningful consolidation that provides scale and scope. Conversely, concentrating it all in just the same few pairs of hands and not doing enough concrete and real devolution of political and of economical power, geographically, is tyrannic. The solution: organize the country around 3 interpedendent regional states and drive them nationally by giving each a set of separate mission and vocations and propell them to compete with each other out of their own interests to see which will control a greater share of the nation's organized creation and accumulation of wealth. Otherwise it will be savage sprawling acts of capitalism with only selfish individual aims everywhere without a common grander purpose for community and country. We all would lose again that way.

I say: Use a simple government by objective approach; give people in many domains, in 21 key domains or sectors to be exact, a clear set of objectives to reach (so they don't have to keep on waiting for a Presidential decree or directive from the central government), give them full responsibility for these objectives and force them to perform according to a set of clear specs. You definitely need a strong central government and a strong Chief of State to do hat. Give them the resources and get out of the way and let them perform regionally and nationally in inter-regions or in cross national efforts coordinated by a central government. After all, it is their country too. Just put together a system to strictly inspect what you expect. Trust but verify. Right now, for all the talk, we are all under-led and under-directed. We would have a Minister of State in charge of the deliverables in each domain nationally and a Regional Minister in charge of the regional share of the deliverables in that domain.

If You could not read the slide, Read This Version:

I stated that to do this, you need to bring about a new form of goverment with focuses on new things, not on the same ministerial departments we have been focusing on for 100 of years now.

Below are the 21 New Central National Cabinet Ministers positions that the Justima's shared vision for the nation proposes to that effect in a fresh take of how to re-organize Haiti so it can be transformed for good in an innovative way for wholesale modernity and stability and prosperity among other things:

1.Minister of State In charge of Technical and Vocational Trades, Skilled Crafts, Petits Metiers and Small Business Administration
2. Minister of State In Charge of National System of Education, of University and Research, of Multi-linguism, of Training and Re-Training of the workforce, of up-skilling and Readiness and Continuing Education of all Professionals
3. Minister of State In Charge of The Arts, of Recreation and Entertainment Industry, of Tourism and Hospitality Industry, of Casino and Money Games and Organized Sports Industries
4. Minister of State in Charge of Agriculture and Ranching and Fishing, of Agribusiness and Food Processing and agro-biotechnology sectors, of The Supermarkets and Open Markets and Food Administration
5. Minister of State of Foreign Affairs, of Promotion of Export and of Haitian Products Marketing Overseas, of Market share and of world markets Penetration
6. Minister of State of The Economy and The Budget, of Finances and of Haiti Tax Revenues Services, of The Banking System and Financial Markets and Off-Shore Investments System
7. Minister of State of Social Services, of Labor and General Pension System, of The Insurances System and of The Social Security and Digitized Vital Records
8. Minister of State of Interior and Public Surety, of Special Bureaus of Investigations and Forensics, of Immigration and Emigration and Customs Surveillance

After these first 8 new central cabinet positions, another slide shows you from the 9th to the 16th domain out of the 21 domains for which we would have new central cabinet ministers with a new focus:

If you still could not see the slide well when you clicked on it, here is what the second ones says:

The 21 New Central National Cabinet Ministers Positions I propose-Continued:

9. Minister of State of National Geographic Studies, of National Geological and Geo-Physical and Environmental Satellite Surveillance System, of Natural Mining Resources Inventory and Haiti Cartography, of Oceanic and Atmospheric Pre-Disaster Surveillance
10. Minister of State of Environmental Engineering, of the Ecology and Exploitation and Soil Conservation of Natural Parks and Scenic Sites, of Urban Planning and Housing and Land Reclamation, and of the Title Record System
11. Minister of State of Telecommunications, of New Information Systems Technologies, of The Medias and Publishing Communications Administration
12. Minister of State of State Assets Inventory and Administration, of Logistics and Concerted Purchasing
13. Minister of State of Energy Production, Distribution, and Consumption, of Exploitation and Administration of All Natural Mines
14. Minister of State of Highways Engineering System, of Mass Transit and Air Transport, Rail Transport and Maritime Transport Administration
15. Minister of State of Civil Engineering Works, of Mechanic and Electric and Structural Engineering Administration, of Architecture and Construction Industries Administration
16. Minister of State of Drinking Water, of Sewer System and Waste Administration, of Waste Water Treatment Plants and Basic Sanitation System Administration

Lastly: I proposes:

17. Minister of State of Health Services, of The Medical Practice and Public Hygiene Administration, of Bio-Medicine and Drugs and Pharmaceutical Substances Administration, of Medicinal Herbs and Plants and Organic Remedies Commercialisation
18. Minister of State of The Manufacturing and Processing Industries, of Commerce and Promotion of Foreign Investments in Haiti
19. Minister of State of The Justice and Jurisprudence System, of Stability of Contracts or Contracts Enforcements, of The National Archives, of the Prisons System, of Coordination of The National System of Local Polices or Polices of Communities
20. Minister of State of The Families and Women Conditions, of Religion and Ethics, of Social Stability and Civism, of Integration of Haitians Living Abroad and of Expatriates Living in Haiti
21. Minister of State of The Political System Administration and of Institutional Stability, of Public Administration, of National Productivity and Performance

In sum, my overall point is: where is the sense of urgency of turning the tides in Haiti, if we keep on prescribing or on doing it the business as usual way, when an entire people is perishing, engulfing daily in dire poverty and misery and negative growth and dysfunctionality? Where is the army that is marching on, in closed ranks, at fast pace, to leave no stone unturned in attempting a massive, 200 year late,transformation of Haiti?

I, as the aspirant national leader of that transformation, do not see how we will ever get there, without embarking that many people in a final run at glory in our recalcitrant island, without giving a sizable material stake to each in the final outcome. If any other potential leader sees a better way or course of action forward, I will be his/her first follower; country first, survive as one and mass-advance as one if what we are doing must take hold. The task I outlined for my country and for us, my countymen and women, is a task that I know and it is a task that many of you know (incidentally many in the political and financial circles around the world know as well) is doable. The time for doing it is now.

In all humility but with great determination to forge ahead and lead ahead, I am
Emmanuel JUSTIMA

Ex-Presidential Candidate of the Senp Sitwayen-Action Democratique political regrouping
Leader of the new Popular Political Platform JWISANS HAITI.2
other site:

Thursday, July 26, 2007

Education in Haiti: Fondation Justima-Education in Haiti and La Releve in Our Classrooms

We have been working on issues like that since 2001. But we stopped just for the last presidential elections of 2006. Now, FONDATION JUSTIMA is geared to resume this important work and to pick up where we left off.
This La Relève in the Classroom Project is to contribute to start bringing answers nationwide to these questions in the classrooms of Haiti with lessons plans that have laboratory, video-support and fresh ideas that can revolutionize teaching in Haiti for the today’s needs of our country and its tomorrow’s demands.

This project’s purpose is to connect every idea our young are learning in Haiti’s classrooms with a fun-filled adventure and challenge of re-imagining one’s native local community in light of that discovery. So, if the young are the young of Cite Soleil, let them re-imagine Cite Soleil, a Cite-Soleil.2, a higher and different version of Cite Soleil in light of the lessons plans discovery. If they are the young of Port-de-Paix, let them re-imagine Port-de-Paix in Port-de-Paix.2, the only conditions to have a different Haiti that plays in a higher plane field, such a new Haiti Justima calls Haiti.2.

1) We are piloting this project in 40 primary and secondary level classrooms of Port-de-Paix, Léogane, Jérémie and Port-au-Prince in which we are providing each classroom with a laboratory, other equipment, and audio-video documentaries in Creole and in French that serve as teaching aids.

2) We want the teachers in these classrooms to use these laboratory and video documentaries to bring the teaching alive in our 4 main areas of concentration of interest_; a) natural and physical sciences, b) applied math, c) history and geography, and c) languages_.
3) We want the teachers to experiment with the students about no longer perpetuating in Haiti the traditional system of rote memorization of a lesson plan that the student cannot even relate to, let alone understand. We want each student to grasp each of these 4 critical areas of interest if their native locality is to secure a different future.

4) We need books, laboratory, back up power generator, telephone satellite, computer and audio-video equipment, and teaching and learning materials in these targeted fields in whatever languages they are. We need also a countless number of Haitians who know these fields well and who are or would be ready to volunteer to help us put together or record the appropriate Creole and/or the French translations and adaptations.

5) Of course we need the operational funds to deploy periodically in these classrooms people like you as La Relève and as supplemental resources for these teachers so we can make this whole experimentation work. Our foundation, FONDATION JUSTIMA is footing the bill but we want your symbolic participation as an encouragement, as a statement that you too care and that we are going to get supported because the problem is not just our problem.

Wednesday, June 6, 2007

Haiti's Presidency: What Presidential Candidate JUSTIMA Plans to do after the Presidential Elections of 2006 in Haiti

People want me to consider to run again, as one of the youngest former Presidential Candidates, at age 40.
But it’s not about me, it’s about the sacrificial gift of my youth to practicing patriotism and it’s about commitment to community and country.
So, I don’t just want to talk about my program for a 5 year presidency for the next general elections scheduled for 2011.
I don’t just want to talk about my 25 to 30 year vision, they say that separates me from the rest, and that will lift the country and enable it to try to catch, as a matter of national goal and pride, South Korea, which was at the same level with Haiti in 1965.
I want, as of now, to do the heavy lifting that my predecessors did not do of teaching my people in Haiti and outside Haiti, more than lessons learned at school, how to advance as a people so the country can advance.
I don’t want to wait for the presidency. I want to teach Haitians deeper things they have overlooked and that make a people a great nation: the value of taking care of self, of each other, the value of taking care of the motherland’s environment, of our roots, of community, and the value of God for a nation as well as the cardinal republican values of liberty, equality, fraternity, stability, modernity, prosperity and posterity for all that must take roots in practice, their beauty and their use in making ordinary people transcend and do extraordinary things the like of what our grandmothers and grand fathers did in 1803 to render 1804 possible.

I want my fellow countrymen to know more than just the personal surviving that everyone is doing right now. I want to teach Haitians a sense of personal and collective curiosity to discover how our country too can have what is great, grand, pretty, modern and standard that others have.

I want to teach us how to think a new national thought so we all leave behind the 1804, 1904, 1957, 1991 moods and modes of thinking because feet are made to work ahead, and eyes are made to see forward, as contemporary Haitians of today, we must look forward and strive to rise to the challenge to be the greatest generation of Haitians since the first one that created the country, in showing posterity that we have successfully tackled not slavery but wholesale misery, negative economic growth, and permanent dysfunctionality to be really free and independent.

I want to teach my people how to think and how to choose what’s right above what’s wrong for the common good and the good of the country, so there is a difference for all, finally in Haiti, between living and living well, for all of us are co- heirs and co-owners of the land by virtue of the deeds of 1803 of the forefather of each one of us, therefore each of us must have a shot at enjoying milking the cow.
I want each of us to get that, so we learn each day to be at peace with each other and to prosper and grow in even better ways than before. I want each of us to choose to be a productive member of one of the 49 new communities or provinces we shall create in Haiti so each of us can blossom at the same time, without bothering each other, and into a higher brand of transformed Haitians who are transforming Haiti as we know it into a new Haїtiana, a Haiti.2, a higher level nation, materially and intellectually, a shining country literally built on the hills.

This is where I see Haiti and where I want to take my nation over a span of 25 to 30 years and for this, Lord, let me be a friend, and a guide and a leader to my people as of now until 2011 arrives, and from that year and beyond and let me be the attractor to those who want to help it and make it happen.

Let me start a whole socio-political movement of new blood, fresh eyes and fresh perspectives called PLATFOM JWISANS YON HAITI.2 that gets everybody on board, Haitians, people of Haitian descent, non-Haitians and friends of Haiti alike.
Let me start a foundation, FONDATION JUSTIMA and let that foundation starts now
1) with a community-violence reduction program that redeems and re-orients the youth of our disadvantaged neighborhoods that are into gangs and kidnappings, for we are loosing a generation,
2) with a house of refuge and of re-orientation for all the young women and pretty teenagers who must sell their body to put food on the table and pay their way to school,
3) with a program of access to real farm and agricultural capital and credit for countless groups of 7 or more peasants organized in production consortium as well as a program of lending them the lands of Haitians living abroad, and
4) with a project of Low Prices Plan that cuts the high prices of food and basic necessities for the people of 250 of our most populated neighborhoods in Haiti so we give an economic breather to the masses.
And finally, with our eyes on the next general elections, let me attract and assemble all the grassroots and pro-people organizations under a one-structured delivery and well-funded political system and machine that provide them with a new cause: a post-Aristide era where each one enjoys too the milking of the national cow, the cow of our newly found national wealth, under the leadership of a new leader for the new times.
JUSTIMA Emmanuel, 7/7/06

Monday, May 7, 2007

Letter From The General Committee of Friends of JUSTIMA For President/Lettre du Comité des Amis de JUSTIMA Pour Président de la République d'Haiti



New York, May 7, 2007

Aux Citoyens, Citoyennes de l’Etranger de la Dominicanie, des USA, du Canada, de France, etc.

À vous qui ne le savez pas encore, les Simples Citoyens d’Haïti et ceux de l’étranger ont décidé d’aller dans une autre et nouvelle direction avec le pays avant que ce ne soit trop tard et partout en Haïti et à l’étranger, nous nous réunissons rien que pour se rencontrer pour mettre en commun nos expériences et créer des liens d'amitié citoyenne et de travail entre tous afin de pouvoir jouer un rôle crucial dans le déploiement de ce grand mouvement de masse depuis Aristide, Plateforme JWISANS YON AYITI.2-TAN SOLEY, qu'est en train de conduire celui qui était parmi les meilleures nouvelles figures politiques et le second plus jeune des Anciens Candidats à la Présidence de la République, lors des élections de Février 2006 dernier, JUSTIMA Emmanuel.

Le travail que nous avons à faire est de choisir pour ces élections de 2011 des élus qui répresentent du sang neuf, qui nous donnent de l'espoir d'un renouvellement des viellieries de la classe politique haïtienne, qui approchent le sous-développement d'Haïti en des termes mobilisants, innovants et productifs et qui nous soutiendront dans l’exercice d’une pleine souveraineté citoyenne exercée sur l’ensemble des pouvoirs en Haïti pour nous assurer que l’Haïti dont nous sommes tous propriétaires ne nuisent plus à nos intérêts en tant que simples citoyens.

Pour arriver à tout cela, nous devons contrôler massivement et rapidement l’échiquier électoral avec cette plateforme HAITI.2 qu'est en train de monter JUSTIMA.
Trop d’Haïtiens sont toujours, dans leur immense majorité, absents des Listes Electorales, et donc dans l’incapacité de participer aux divers scrutins. Pourtant, ce premier pas citoyen est essentiel. Ce déficit citoyen doit être comblé par un « voters’ registration drive », par une vaste campagne en Haïti pour se procurer sa carte electorale et aussi par une vaste campagne même à l’étranger pour ceux-là qui ne sont encore que rien des résidents et qui ne se sont pas naturalisés, et qui peuvent rentrer en Haïti faire une carte d’identité et une carte électorale dans des conditions controlées pour ne pas laisser la situation de l'insécurité les intimider pendant que les autres qui ont osé, font leur beurre sur notre dos.

Ainsi nos rencontres à l’étranger sont urgentes et importantes et le temps est un facteur essentiel « time is of the esence ». Cette prochaine rencontre a comme objectif premier connaître ceux qui ont pris en main le leadership du mouvement en Haïti et à l’étranger, mais aussi la recherche des moyens financiers et des initiatives nécessaires pour convaincre le plus grand nombre de ressortissants Haïtiens à s'inscrire dans les Listes Electorales, pour pouvoir exercer leur droit de voter et d'être élus.

Car, comme le dit Justima, " la nation a besoin de sang neuf. Car la nation a besoin de renouveler et son stock de ceux qui veulent nous gouverner, et son stock de capital qui finance le présent et l’avenir du pays". Et vous qui êtes à l’étranger, oui Vous, vous avez le droit de voter et d’être êlus. Vous avez le droit de faire des millions en aidant des millions. Et vous avez la responsabilité de vous mobiliser et le devoir de vous rendre en Haiti à tour de rôle pour retirer chacun votre carte d’identification nationale. Car pour balancer ce qui se passe en Haiti, vous avez pour devoir de faire peser le poids de nos différentes diasporas, non pas en attendant qu'on vous jette des miettes en vous miroitant de vous laisser voter à l'étranger mais en allant directement en Haïti saisir ce qui est votre, être citoyen co-déterminateur de tout ce qui se détermine et co-constructeur de tout ce qui se construit selon la doctrine que prône Justima.

La deuxième chose qui doit nous mobiliser c’est, en second lieu, les Haïtiens de l’étranger qui sont des naturalisés. Puisqu'ils ne peuvent pas se rendre en Haïti pour se procurer une carte électorale, il nous faut les mobiliser en revanche avec nous derrière une grande ambition : d'aller voter avec les tous les Haïtiens résidés, symboliquement, durant les prochaines élections legislatives en Haïti et de voter dans chacune des 21 communautés haïtiennes de l’étranger, pour 1 député et 1 sénateur à titre honorifique par communauté haïtienne de l’étranger, soit 21 députés et 21 sénateurs honoraires qui iront participer au parlement haïtien en 2009, avec voix consultatives,aux délibérations de la nation.

La nation est une, et elle est formée aussi des Haïtiens de l’étranger. Cette question est vitale pour notre avenir. Nous avons besoin de vous.

Bien cordialement,
_____________________ Joe REMY
Vice-Président du Comité Central

Wednesday, March 21, 2007

Fondation Justima plans Low Prices Plan to give direct economic relief to 250,000 households in Haiti/Fondation Justima Lancera Plan Baisse desCouts

Soon, we will publish the brochure about this revolutionary idea of Fondation Justima and its locals and international partners, using Joe Kennedy's formula of selling products of basic necessities at at least 40% the going prices, to sell 7 key basic food items at bulk discounted prices to 250 of the most populated neighborhoods of the poorest country of this western hemisphere: Haiti

Wednesday, January 24, 2007

JustimaBlogspot Open University: Haiti's Hail to the Chief- L'Hymne Présidentiel d'Haïti

Haiti's Hail to the Chief- L'Hymne Présidentiel Haïtien

"Quand nos Aïeux brisèrent leurs entraves"
(When our Fathers broke their Chains)

Words by: Oswald Durand
Music by: Occide JeantyIn use: 1893-1903

In 1893 a visiting warship to the Haitian capital was required by protocol to perform the Haitian anthem. Since Haiti did not yet have an anthem, the composer Occide Jeanty offered to compose music for the patriotic poem "Quand nos Aïeux brisèrent leurs entraves."

This was completed that night and the anthem was debuted aboard the ship. It remained as an unofficial national anthem until a new one was chosen to mark Haiti's centennial on January 1, 1904. The former anthem still remains in use as a presidential salute.

The Next Generation of Presidential Leaders

HAITI's National Palace

Special thanks to: Jan Scotland for some of this information.
and to

Quand nos Aïeux brisèrent leurs entraves
Ce n'était pas pour se croiser les bras
Pour travailler en maîtres les esclaves
Ont embrassé corps à corps le trépas.
Leur sang à flots engraissa nos collines,
A notre tour, jaunes et noirs, allons!
Creusons le sol légué par Dessalines :
Notre fortune est là dans nos vallons.

L'indépendance est éphémère
Sans le droit à l'égalité!
Pour fouler, heureux, cette terre
Il nous faut la devise austère :
Dieu! Le Travail! La Liberté!

Quoi de plus beau que ces fils de l'Afrique
Qui, trois cent ans dans tous les maux plongés,
Tournent leurs fers, leur carcan et leur trique
Contre la force et les vieux préjugés!
En bas voyez! c'est la noble bannière
Cernant les noirs qui vont mourir là-haut
Non! leur torrent avec Lamartinière
Descend fougueux à la Crête-à-Pierrot.

Tout cela serait éphémère
Sans le droit à l'égalité!
Pour fouler, heureux, cette terre
Il nous faut la devise austère :
Dieu! Le Travail! La Liberté!

De Rochambeau les cohortes altières,
Quelques instants, suspendirent le feu
Pour saluer le Héros de Vertières,
Capois-la-Mort, grand comme un demi-dieu.
Vers le progrès crions comme ce brave :
"Noirs, en avant! En avant!" Et bêchons
Le sol trempé des sueurs de l'esclave!
Nous avons là ce qu'ailleurs nous cherchons

Sans quoi tout devient éphémère
Pas d'ordre et pas de liberté
Pour fouler, heureux, cette terre
Il nous faut la devise austère :
Dieu! Le Travail! La Liberté!

Sang des martyrs dont la pourpre écumante
A secoué nos chaînes et nos jougs!
Chavanne, Ogé, sur la route infamante,
Toi, vieux Toussaint, dans ton cachot de Joux
O précurseurs, dont les dernières fibres
Ont dû frémir, - vous les porte-flambeaux -
En nous voyant maintenant fiers et libres,
Conseillez-nous du fond de vos tombeaux!

Votre bonheur est éphémère;
Ayez droit à l’égalité!
Pour fouler, heureux, cette terre,
Il vous faut la devise austère:
Dieu! Le travail! La liberté!

A l’oeuvre donc, descendants de l’Afrique,
Jaunes et noirs, fils du même berceau!
L’antique Europe et la jeune Amérique
Nous voient de loin tenter le rude assaut.
Bêchons le sol qu’en l’an mil huit cent quatre,
Nous ont conquis nos aïeux au bras fort.
C’est notre tour à présent de combattre
Avec ce cri: "Le progrès ou la mort!"

A l’oeuvre! Ou tout est éphémère!
Ayons droit à l’égalité!
Nous foulerons, plus fiers, la terre,
Avec cette devise austère:
Dieu! Le travail! La liberté!

When our fathers broke their chains
this was not to fold their arms
and to let slaves work for them as masters
Side by side, till death.
Their streams of blood soaked our hills
But now our turn came, Brown and Black, onward!
Plough the soil of Dessalines:
Our wealth is here in our small valleys.

Independence is fugitive,(elusive, short-lived, passing blip)
without the right of equality!
To plough (cheerfully) this soil with joy
we (must have) need this strict motto:
God! (Work) Labour ! Freedom!

What can there be more beautiful than this children of Africa
who, after threehundred years of deepest bondage cast,
turned iron, yoke and truncheon
against the hostile powers and against old prejudices!
See from down there! It is the noble banner,
that unites the Blacks, who are ready to die there at the top!
But no! The crowds of Lamartinière
descend like foaming flood from La Crête-à-Pierrot.

Everything is fugitive (elusive, short-lived, passing blips)
without the right of equality!
To plough (cheerfully) this soil with joy
we (must uphold) need this strict motto:
God! (Work) Labour! Freedom!

The proud troops of Rochambeau
suspended fire for a moment
To salute the hero of Vertières
Capois-la-Mort, great as a second god.
Towards progress, cries the brave:
"Blacks, onward! Onward!" and plough
this soil, which is soaked with the sweat of slaves!
It is here, what we were hoping for to find it somewhere else.

Without this everything is fugitive (elusive, short-lived, passing blips):
Without order and freedom!
To plough (cheerfully) this soil with joy
we (must have) need this strict motto:
God! (Work)Labour! Freedom!

The purple blood of the martyrs foamed
over our chains and yokes!
Chavanne, Ogé on this horrible road
you, old Toussaint, in your prison of Joux,
and our fathers, marching ahead,
with trembling hearts - You carried the torch.
Us, who are now proud and free,
Guide us from the ground of your tombs!

Your fortune is fugitive (elusive, short-lived, passing blip)
without the right of equality!
To plough (cheerfully) this soil with joy
You must (uphold) need this strict motto:
God! (Work) Labour! Freedom!

Now to work, you decendants of Africa,
Brown and Black, children from the same cradle!
The old Europe and the young America
try again to suppress us from far away.
Plough the soil, which, in the year eighteenhundred and four
our fathers conquered with strong arm.
Now it is our turn to fight,
with the cry "Progress or Death!"

Now to work! Or everything is fugitive (elusive, short-lived, passing blip)!
Let's have the right of equality!
We will plough (cheerfully) this soil with even more pride
with this strict motto:
God! Labour! Freedom!

The Chiefs who have governed Haiti from 1625
Les Chefs qui ont Gouverné Haïti depuis 1625

1631 - 1634: Anthony Hilton (English governor) (d. 1634)
1633 - Jul 1652: Jean de Levassuer(d. 1652) (French governor)
1635: Nicholas Riskinner (d. 1635) (English governor)
1639 - 1640: Robert Flood (English governor)
1652 - Jan 1654: Timolén Hotman de Fontenay, chevalier de Fontenay Jan 1654 - 1655: Spanish rule

1656 - 1659: Elias Watts (English governor)

Governors of Saint-Domingue
1656 - 1662: Jérémie Deschamps,chevalier du Raussac et du Moussac
1662 - Jun 1665: Frédéric Deschamps de la Place (acting)
Jun 1665 - 1668: Bertrand Denis d’Ogeron (d. 1675) 1st time)
1668 - Jun 1669: Jacques Nepveu de Pouançay,(d. 1683)(1st time)
Jun 1669 - Feb 1673: Bertrand Denis d'Ogeron 2nd time)
Apr 1673: Jerôme du Sarrat de la Perrière acting)
Apr 1673 - 16 Mar 1675: Bertrand Denis dogtrot (3rd time)
16 Mar 1675 - Sep 1675: Louvilliers de Poincy
Sep 1675 - 1676: Pierre Paul Tarin de Cussy (d. 1691) 1st time)(acting)
1676 - 1683: Jacques Nepveu de Pouançay, (2nd time)
1683 - Apr 1684: François Depardieu de Franquesnay acting)
Apr 1684 - Jan 1691: Pierre Paul Tarin de Cussy (2nd time)(acting)
Jan 1691 - Oct 1691: Dumas (acting)
1 Oct 1691 - Jul 1700: Jean-Baptiste Ducasse (d. 1715)
Mar 1697 - May 1697: Jacques Yvon, sieur Deslandes (acting for Ducasse)
May 1697 - Jun 1697: Compte de Boissyraimé (acting for Ducasse)
Jul 1700 - 16 Dec 1703: Joseph d'Honon de Gallifet (acting)
16 Dec 1703 - 13 Feb 1705: Charles Auger (d. 1705)
13 Oct 1705 - 28 Dec 1707: Jean-Pierre de Charitte (1st time)(acting)
28 Dec 1707 - 1710: François Joseph, compte de (d. 1711) Choiseul-Beauprés.
1710 - 7 Feb 1711: Jean-Pierre de Charitte(2nd time)
7 Feb 1711 - 24 May 1711: Laurent de Valernod (d. 1711)
24 May 1711 - 29 Aug 1712: Nicolas de Gabaret (d. 1712)
29 Aug 1712 - 1713: Paul François de La Grange, (d. 1745)
1713 - Jan 1714: Louis de Courbon, (- d. 1722) Governors-general

Jan 1714 - 11 Jan 1717: Louis de Courbon, comte de Blénac
11 Jan 1717 - 10 Jul 1719: Charles Joubert de la Bastide, (d. 1722)
10 Jul 1719 - 6 Dec 1723: Léon, marquis de Sorel (d. 1743)
6 Dec 1723 - 8 Oct 1731: Gaspard Charles de Goussé
8 Oct 1731 - 4 Feb 1732: Antoine Gabriel, marquis de Vienne (d. 1732)
4 Feb 1732 - 8 Oct 1732: Étienne Cochard de Chastenoy(1st time)(acting)
8 Oct 1732 - 11 Aug 1737: Pierre, marquis de Fayet (d. 1737)
Aug 1737 - 11 Nov 1737: Étienne Cochard de Chastenoy (2nd time)(acting)
11 Nov 1737 - 19 Nov 1746: Charles de Brunier, marquis de Larnage
19 Nov 1746 - 12 Aug 1748: Étienne Cochard de Chastenoy (3rd time)
12 Aug 1748 - 29 Mar 1751: Hubert de Brienne, (d. 1777)
29 Mar 1751 - 31 May 1753: Emmanuel Auguste de Cahideux (d. 1764)
31 May 1753 - 24 Mar 1757: Joseph Hyacinthe de Rigaud, (d. 1764) marquis de Vaudreuil
24 Mar 1757 - 30 Jul 1762: Philippe François Bart (d. 1784)
30 Jul 1762 - 7 Mar 1763: Gabriel de Bory de Saint-Vincent (d. 1801)
7 Mar 1763 - 4 Aug 1763: Armand, vicompte de Belzunce (d.1763)
4 Aug 1763 - 23 Apr 1764: Pierre André de Gohin,(acting)
23 Apr 1764 - 1 Jul 1766: Jean Baptiste Charles Henri, (d. 1794) compte d'Estaing
1 Jul 1766 - 10 Feb 1769: Louis Armand Constantin de Rohan, (d. 1794)
10 Feb 1769 - 15 Jan 1772: Pierre Gédéon
15 Jan 1772 - 30 Apr 1772: De la Ferronays (acting)
30 Apr 1772 - 15 Apr 1775: Louis Florent, marquis de Valière (d. 1775)
12 May 1775 - 16 Aug 1775: Jean-François de Villeverd 1st time)(acting)
16 Aug 1775 - 13 Dec 1776: Victor Thérèse Charpentier, (d. 1776) compte d'Ennery
28 Dec 1776 - 22 May 1777: Jean-Baptiste de Taste de Lilancour(1st time) (acting)
22 May 1777 - 7 Mar 1780: Robert, (d. 1780)
7 Mar 1780 - 25 Apr 1780: Jean-Baptiste de Taste de Lilancour (2nd time) (acting)
25 Apr 1780 - 28 Jul 1781 Jean-François, de Villeverd (2nd time)
28 Jul 1781 - 14 Feb 1782: Jean-Baptiste de Taste de Lilancour(3rd time)
14 Feb 1782 - 3 Jul 1785: Guillaume Léonard de Bellecombe,(1792)
3 Jul 1785 - 27 Apr 1786: Gui Pierre de Coustard (acting)
27 Apr 1786 - Nov 1787: César Henri,(d. 1799)
Nov 1787 - 22 Dec 1788: Alexandre de Vincent de Mazade (1st time)
22 Dec 1788 - 1789: Marie Charles, marquis du Chilleau
1789: Alexandre de Vincent de Mazade (s.a.)(2nd time) (acting)
19 Aug 1789 - Nov 1790: Louis Antoine Thomassin,(d. 1790) compte de Peynier
9 Nov 1790 - 1792:Philibert François Rouxel
29 Nov 1791 - 1Apr 1792: Frédéric de Mirbeck -Commissioner
29 Nov 1791 - 18 Sep 1792: Philippe Roume de Saint- Laurent Commissioner (1st time)
1792: Adrien Nicolas, marquis de la Salle
Jun 1792 - 23 Oct 1792: Jean Jacques d'Esparbès de Lussan (d. 1810)
23 Oct 1792 - 2 Jan 1793: Donatien Marie Joseph de Vimeur, (d. 1813) :Compte de Rochambeau (1st time)

2 Jan 1793 - 19 Jun 1793: Léger Félicité Sonthonax (d. 1813) (1st time) -Commissioner
19 Jun 1793 - Oct 1793 François Galbaud du Fort
Oct 1793 - 11 May 1796: Étienne Maynaud Bizefranc

British Occupied Portion of Saint-Domingue
Military Governors 19 Sep 1793 - Oct 1794: John Whitelock (d. 1833)
Oct 1794 - May 1795: Adam Williamson (d. 1798)
Governors May 1795 - Oct 1796: Adam Williamson
Oct 1796 - 1 Jan 1797: John Graves Simcoe
1 Jan 1797 - Mar 1797: Nesbit
21 Mar 1797 - 2 Oct 1798: Thomas Maitland

Toward End of British and French Rule on 2 portions of Haiti
11 May 1796 - 24 Aug 1797: Léger Félicité Sonthonax (s.a.) (2nd time) -

1 Apr 1797 - 5 May 1802: Pierre François Dominique Toussaint-Louverture

27 Mar 1798 - 23 Oct 1798: Gabriel Marie Théodore-Joseph Hédouville -
Oct 1798 - Nov 1800: Philippe Roume de Saint-Laurent -Commissioner (2nd time)
14 Jan 1801 - 180.: Lequoy Mongiraud -Prefect
5 Feb 1802 - 2 Nov 1802: Charles Victor Emmanuel Leclerc (d. 1802)
2 Nov 1802 - 30 Nov 1803: Donatien Marie Joseph de Vimeur,
Compte de Rochambeau (2nd time)

30 Nov 1803 - 31 Dec 1803: Jean-Jacques Dessalines (b. 1758 - d. 1806)

1 Jan 1804 Independence (Haiti)

Governor-general 1 Jan 1804 - 22 Sep 1804: Jean-Jacques Dessalines (d. 1806)

Emperor 22 Sep 1804 - 17 Oct 1806: Jacques I

Provisional Chief of the Haitian Government 17 Oct 1806 - 17 Feb 1807: Henry Christophe (b. 1767 - d. 1820)

President 17 Feb 1807 - 28 Mar 1811: Henry Christophe
King¹ 28 Mar 1811 - 8 Oct 1820: Henri I

Presidents 28 Dec 1806 - 27 Jan 1807: Henri Christophe (b. 1767 - d. 1820) (did not take office)

27 Jan 1807 - 10 Mar 1807: Bruno Blanchet (acting)
10 Mar 1807 - 9 Mar 1811 Anne-Alexandre Sabès, dit Pétion (b. 1770 - d. 1818) "Papa Bon Coeur" (Father Good Heart) (1st time)

9 Mar 1811 - 10 Mar 1811: Jean-Chrisostôme Imbert (1st time)(d. 1855) (acting)
10 Mar 1811 - 9 Mar 1815: Anne-Alexandre Sabès, dit Pétion (2nd time)
9 Mar 1815 - 10 Mar 1815: Jean-Chrisostôme Imbert (2nd time)(acting)

10 Mar 1815 - 29 Mar 1818: Anne-Alexandre Sabès, dit Pétion (3rd time)
29 Mar 1818 - 30 Mar 1818: Jean-Chrisostôme Imbert (3rd time)(acting)
30 Mar 1818 - 13 Mar 1843: Jean-Pierre Boyer-Bazelais (d. 1850)
13 Mar 1843 - 4 Apr 1843: Charles Hérard aîné, dit Rivière (d. 1850) (1st time) (Chief Executive)
4 Apr 1843 - 5 Apr 1843: Provisional Government
- José María Imbert
- Voltaire (d. 1843)
- Philippe Guerrier (d. 1845)
- N. Segrettier

5 Apr 1843 - 2 May 1844: Charles Hérard aîné, dit Riviére (2nd time) (Chief of Provisional Government to 4 Jan 1844)

Apr 1844 - 1844: Louis Jean-Jacques Acaau (d. 1846) (General, in charge of grievances; in rebellion)

3 May 1844 - 15 Apr 1845: Philippe Guerrier
15 Apr 1845 - 16 Apr 1845: Council of Secretaries of State
- Alexis Beaubrun Ardouin (b. 1796 - d. 1865)
- Jacques Sylvain Gelin Hyppolite (b. 1784 - d. 1857)
- Jean Paul (b. 1800 - d. 1872) - ....

16 Apr 1845 - 1 Mar 1846: Jean-Louis Pierrot, baron Pierrot (1857)
1 Mar 1846 - 27 Feb 1847: Jean-Baptiste Riché (d. 1847)
27 Feb 1847 - 1 Mar 1847: Council of Secretaries of State
- Charles Céligny Ardouin (d. 1849)
- Alexis Maurice Dupuy - .... - ....

1 Mar 1847 - 26 Aug 1849: Faustin Élie Soulouque
Emperor 26 Aug 1849 - 15 Jan 1859: Faustin I

15 Jan 1859 - 13 Mar 1867: Fabre Nicolas Geffrard (d. 1879) (President of the Revolutionary Committee [in rebellion from 23 Dec 1858] to 23 Jan 1859)

13 Mar 1867 - Mar 1867: Council of Secretaries of State
Mar 1867 - 20 Mar 1867 Consultative Council
20 Mar 1867 -2 May 1867: Jean Nicholas Nissage-Saget (d. 1880) (1st time) President of Provisional Government)
2 May 1867 - 4 May 1867: Provisional Government
- Jean Nicholas Nissage-Saget
- Victor Jean-Marie Eustache (b. 1815 - d. 1869) Chevallier, dit Victorin
- Sylvain Salnave (b. 1826 - d. 1870)

4 May 1867 - 27 Dec 1869: Sylvain Salnave (Protector of the Republic to 16 Jun 1867)

27 Dec 1869 - 13 May 1874: Jean Nicholas Nissage-Saget (2nd time) (President of Provisional Government to 20 Mar 1870)

13 May 1874 - 14 Jun 1874: Council of Secretaries of State
- Pierre Charles Barthélemy Denis, (b. 1822 - d. 1884) dit Darius Denis
- Désilus Lamour
- Justin Alexis Victor Turenne Carrié - et al.

14 Jun 1874 - 15 Apr 1876: Michel Domingue

15 Apr 1876 - 23 Apr 1876: Council of Secretaries of State
23 Apr 1876 - 17 Jul 1879: Pierre Théoma Boisrond-Canal (d. 1905) (1st time) (President of Provisional Government to 17 Jul 1876)

17 Jul 1879 - 26 Jul 1879: Central Committee of Public Safety
26 Jul 1879 - 2 Oct 1879 Joseph Lamothe (President of Provisional Government)

2 Oct 1879 - 10 Aug 1888: Louis Étienne Lysius Félicité Salomon, dit Lysius Salomon jeune,(President of Provisional Government to 26 Oct 1879)
27 Mar 1883 - 27 Oct 1883: Jean-Pierre Boyer-Bazelais (d. 1884) (chief executive of the Central Revolutionary Committee)

Aug 1888 -16 Oct 1888 Pierre Théoma Boisrond-Canal(2nd time) (President of Revolutionary Committee to 23 Aug 1888,
then President of Provisional Government)

16 Oct 1888 - 22 Aug 1889: François Denys Légitime (d. 1935)

22 Aug 1889 - 23 Aug 1889: Council of Secretaries of State 23 Aug 1889 - 17 Oct 1889 Monpoint jeune,(President of Provisional Government)

17 Oct 1889 - 24 Mar 1896: Louis Mondestin Florvil Hyppolite (d. 1896)

24 Mar 1896 - 31 Mar 1896: Council of Secretaries of State
- Tirésias Antoine Auguste Simon-Sam
- Jean Antoine Tancrède Auguste (d. 1913)
- Solon Ménos (d. 1918) - et al.

31 Mar 1896 - 12 May 1902: Tirésias Antoine Auguste Simon-Sam
12 May 1902 - 26 May 1902: Central Committee of Public Welfare
26 May 1902 - 17 Dec 1902 Pierre Théoma Boisrond-Canal (3rd time) (President of Provisional Government)

4 Aug 1902 - 15 Oct 1902: Joseph Anténor Firmin (President of the Executive Council; in rebellion)

17 Dec 1902 - 2 Dec 1908: Pierre Nord Alexis (b. 1820 - d. 1910) (Head of Executive Power to 23 Dec 1902)

2 Dec 1908 - 5 Dec 1908: Public Order Commission
- Louis-Auguste Boisrond-Canal (b. 1847 - d. 1940) - et al.

6 Dec 1908 - 3 Aug 1911: François C. Antoine "A.T." Simon (d. 1923) (Head of Executive Power to 21 Dec 1908)

24 Jul 1911 - 8 Aug 1912: Jean-Jacques Dessalines Michel Cincinnatus Leconte (Supreme Chief of the Revolution to 7 Aug 1911; Head of Executive Power 7-14 Aug 1911)

8 Aug 1912: Council of Secretaries
- Edmond Lespinasse (1st time)
- Antoine Constantin Sansaricq (b. 1868 - d. 1941)
- Jacques Nicolas Léger (1st time) (b. 1859 - d. 1918)
- John Déjoie Laroche (b. 1861 - d. 1921)
- Tertulien Guilbaud (1st time) (b. 1856 - d. 1937)

8 Aug 1912 - 3 May 1913: Jean Antoine Tancrède Auguste
3 May 1913 - 12 May 1913: Council of Secretaries
- F. Baufossé Laroche (b. 1865 - d. 1921)
- Seymour Pradel (b. 1876 - d. 1943)
- Jacques Nicolas Léger (2nd time)
- Tertulien Guilbaud (2nd time)
- Edmond Lespinasse (2nd time)
- A. Guatimosin Boco

12 May 1913 - 27 Jan 1914: Michel Oreste Lafontant, dit Michel-Oreste
27 Jan 1914 - 2. Jan 1914: Council of Secretaries
2. Jan 1914 - 8 Feb 1914 Edmond Sylvestre Polynice (1st time) (chairman Committee of Public Welfare)

8 Feb 1914 - 29 Oct 1914: Emmanuel Oreste Zamor (d. 1915)
29 Oct 1914 - 6 Nov 1914: Edmond Sylvestre Polynice 2nd time) (chairman Committee of Public Welfare)

6 Nov 1914 - 22 Feb 1915: Joseph Davilmar Théodore (d. 1917) (Head of Executive Power to 10 Nov 1914)

22 Feb 1915 - 2. Feb 1915: Committee of Public Welfare
- Seymour Pradel
- Edmond Sylvestre Polynice

2. Feb 1915 - 25 Feb 1915: Committee of Administration
25 Feb 1915 - 28 Jul 1915: Jean Vilbrun Guillaume Sam (d. 1915) (Head of Executive Power to 9 Mar 1915)

28 Jul 1915 - 11 Aug 1915: Revolutionary Committee
- Charles de Delva
- Edmond Sylvestre Polynice
- Diogène Dèlinois
- Charles Zamor (d. 1931)
- Gaston Dalencourt
- Ermane Robin

12 Aug 1915 - 15 May 1922: Philippe Sudre Dartiguenave (d. 1926)
15 May 1922 - 15 May 1930: Eustache Antoine François Joseph Louis Borno
15 May 1930 - 18 Nov 1930: Louis Eugène Roy (d. 1938)
18 Nov 1930 - 15 May 1941: Sténio Joseph Vincent (d. 1959)
15 May 1941 - 11 Jan 1946: Élie Lescot (d. 1974)
11 Jan 1946 - 16 Aug 1946: Franck Lavaud (1st time) (chairman Military Executive Committee)

16 Aug 1946 - 10 May 1950: Dumarsais Estimé (d. 1953)
10 May 1950 - 6 Dec 1950: Franck Lavaud (2nd time) (chairman Government Junta)

6 Dec 1950 - 12 Dec 1956: Paul Eugène Magloire (d. 2001) (Head of Executive Power from 6 Dec 1956)
12 Dec 1956 - 4 Feb 1957: Joseph Nemours Pierre-Louis (provisional)

7 Feb 1957 - 1 Apr 1957: Franck Sylvain (provisional) (d. 1987)
1 Apr 1957 - 6 Apr 1957: Léon Cantave (1st time) (d. 1967) (Army Chief of General Staff)
6 Apr 1957 - 20 May 1957: Executive Government Council
- Léonce M. Bernard (d. 1984)
- Georges Bretous
- Stuart Cambronne
- Antoine Pierre-Paul (to 24 Apr 1957)
- Ti Vilfort Beauvoir (to 24 Apr 1957)
- Weber Michaud
Seymour Lamothe
- Raoul Fabre Daguilh
- Théodore A. Nicoleau (to 24 Apr 1957)
- Ernest B. Danache
- Emmanuel Bruny
- Max Bolté
- Grégoire Eugène (b. 1924)

20 May 1957 - 25 May 1957: Léon Cantave (2nd time) (Army Chief of General Staff)
25 May 1957 - 14 Jun 1957: Pierre Eustache Daniel Fignolé (d. 1986)MOP (provisional)

14 Jun 1957 - 22 Oct 1957: Antonio Thrasybule Kébreau (d. 1963) (chairman Military Council)
22 Oct 1957 - 21 Apr 1971: François Duvalier "Papa Doc" (d. 1971)PUN/Non-party (chief of the revolution 15 - 22 May 1963)
21 Apr 1971 - 6 Feb 1986: Jean-Claude Duvalier "Baby Doc" (b. 1951)

6 Feb 1986 - 7 Feb 1988: Henri Namphy (1st time) (b. 1932) (chairman National Council)
7 Feb 1988 - 20 Jun 1988: Leslie François Manigat (b. 1930) RDNP
20 Jun 1988 - 17 Sep 1988: Henri Namphy (2nd time)
17 Sep 1988 - 10 Mar 1990: Prosper Avril (b. 1937)
10 Mar 1990 - 13 Mar 1990: Hérard Abraham (interim) (b. 1940)
13 Mar 1990 - 7 Jan 1991: Ertha Pascal-Trouillot (f) (b. 1943) (provisional)

7 Jan 1991: (hours) Roger Lafontant (provisional) (b. 1931? - d. 1991)

7 Jan 1991 - 7 Feb 1991: Ertha Pascal-Trouillot (f) 2nd time
7 Feb 1991 - 30 Sep 1991: Jean-Bertrand Aristide² (1st time) (b. 1953) FNCD
1 Oct 1991 - 8 Oct 1991: Raoul Cédras (b. 1949) (leader of military junta)

8 Oct 1991 - 19 Jun 1992: Joseph C. Nérette (provisional) (b. 1924)

19 Jun 1992 - 15 Jun 1993: Marc Bazin (acting) (b. 1932) MIDH

15 Jun 1993 - 12 May 1994: Jean-Bertrand Aristide (2nd time) OPL-Lavalas Lavalas (in exile, but recognized in Haiti)
12 May 1994 - 12 Oct 1994: Émile Jonassaint (provisional) (b. 1913 - d. 1995)
12 Oct 1994 - 7 Feb 1996: Jean-Bertrand Aristide (3rd time) OPL-Lavalas
7 Feb 1996 - 7 Feb 2001: René Garcia Préval (1st time) (b. 1943) OPL
7 Feb 2001 - 29 Feb 2004: Jean-Bertrand Aristide (4th time) FL

29 Feb 2004 - 14 May 2006: Boniface Alexandre (provisional) (b. 1936) 14 May 2006: - René Garcia Préval (2nd time) PL

Saturday, January 20, 2007

JustimaBlogspot Open University: Lessons to be learned toward understanding The Big Neighbor The US in Haiti and in the Caribbean Basin

The Caribbean Basin
by Robert A. Pastor*

Scholars of inter-American relations have devoted considerable efforts to try to locate the motive for U.S. involvement in the internal affairs of its neighbors. Instead of a single answer, they have amassed a collection of explanations that range from security (keep out rivals, maintain stability), political/ideological (promote democracy, prevent Communism or "alien" ideologies), economic (imperialism, access to investment or trade), to psychological (an impulse to dominate, a fear of insecurity, misperception). A particular explanation might be cogent for a case, but in trying to understand what moves the United States over time, one needs to look for patterns in the history of U.S. relations with the region.

One pattern is the way in which U.S. attention to the region has fluctuated between obsession and disinterest. I have referred to this pattern as a "whirlpool,"[1] a whirling eddy, which occasionally sucks the United States into a vortex of crisis where it becomes preoccupied by small neighbors or their leaders. U.S. presidents react to these crises with security, political, and economic programs that have their historical antecedents even if the policymakers of the time are not aware of them. Then, almost as suddenly, U.S. interest and resources shift away from the region, and many Americans can hardly recall either their nemesis or the reason for their intervention. Americans then feel they have escaped the whirlpool, but history suggests that they are on the rim, only to be pulled into the vortex with the next crisis.

Although the history of U.S. relations with the Caribbean Basin is replete with examples of America's drive to extract resources, uproot "alien" ideologies, implant a political philosophy, or prescribe an economic orthodoxy, this whirlpool pattern suggests that the dominant motive over time has been U.S. security. The United States has been motivated not so much to control the region but to keep things from veering out of control where they could be exploited by others viewed as hostile. The line separating a policy of control and a need to keep things from veering out of control is not always easy to locate, but the moment to look would be after the passing of a crisis. If the U.S. motive was to control the nation, it would retain a military presence after the crisis; if the U.S. wanted just to keep rivals out, then it would withdraw after the crisis, as it has usually done in the Caribbean Basin.

The nations in the Caribbean Basin are too small and poor to merit an acquisitive policy or to constitute a direct threat to the United States; the threat that has moved the United States was that more powerful adversaries from Europe or Asia could forge a relationship with a small nation that would permit it to be used as a base to attack or harass the United States or its neighbors. When the threat diminishes, U.S. interest diminishes. That accounts for the apparent cycle between preoccupation at moments of intense geopolitical rivalry and neglect at times of geopolitical calm.

The end of the Cold War raises, once again, the question as to whether the United States has escaped the whirlpool of unproductive relations or whether it is just at its rim. Interest in the region has declined, but is it permanent? That question can only be addressed satisfactorily after we review the history of U.S. policy toward the Caribbean Basin and examine the changes that have occurred in the last two decades.

A Survey Of U.S. PolicyU.S. foreign policy toward the Caribbean Basin has been the sum of the answers to questions as to whether the United States ought to have a "special relationship" with the region and what that means; questions of how to preclude instability, discourage foreign penetration, defeat anti-American revolutionaries, promote peaceful political change, foment economic development, defend human rights, reinforce democracy, gain respect for U.S. investment, the American flag, and U.S. citizens, and maintain good relations with our neighbors. Answers to these questions have differed from one administration to the next, and particularly when there is a change in the party in power. But the differences have never been as much as the administration claims at its beginning, nor as little as it suggests when its power is waning or its policy is wanting, and it seeks strength by asserting continuity or bipartisanship. Nonetheless, in identifying the threads of continuity that have tied presidents as different as Carter and Reagan, one can better appreciate the elusive concept, "national interest." In discerning the changes in policy toward similar problems, we might better establish the boundaries of real choice.

In the twentieth century, U.S. foreign policy toward the Caribbean Basin can be divided into four periods: (1) the protectorate era, 1898-1933; (2) the Good Neighbor Policy, 1933-1953; (3) the Cold War, 1953-1990; and (4) the post-Cold War era.

The Protectorate Era
The United States has always been of two minds--realistic and idealistic--on how to relate to the Caribbean Basin. It has aimed to prevent foreign rivals from getting a foothold, but it has also sought ways to embody its idealism in policy. The tension between these two sides was captured in two Congressional amendments passed within three years of the other. The Teller Amendment to the Declaration of War against Spain in 1898 declared that the United States would not annex Cuba, the main prize of the war. In an age of imperialism, this was an unusual act of self-denial, and some leaders, notably Theodore Roosevelt, took pride in the amendment as proof that U.S. motives were different and purer than those of Europe.

The Platt Amendment was passed in 1901 to grant the United States rights to intervene in Cuba's internal affairs to protect lives and property and preserve Cuban independence. This amendment not only appears self-contradictory--how can U.S. intervention preserve Cuban independence?--but it also appears to negate the Teller Amendment. In actuality, the amendments represented the two sides of the American perspective on Cuba and, more broadly, the Caribbean area. The United States wanted Cuba to be free, but it feared that too much freedom could cause instability and foreign--i.e., non-U.S.--intervention, and so it imposed limits.

Those limits were enunciated in President Theodore Roosevelt's "Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine," a message to Congress in December 1904. Roosevelt wrote that "chronic wrongdoing, or an impotence which results in a general loosening of ties of civilized society . . . may force the United States, however, reluctantly . . . to the exercise of an international police power." Just three years before, Roosevelt allowed three European governments to intervene to collect debts from Venezuela provided no territory was acquired. His position changed for three reasons: the American public reacted very negatively to the European bombing of a fellow American republic; in 1903, the United States signed a treaty to build a Canal in Panama; and in 1904, the country with a debt problem was the Dominican Republic--a lot closer than Venezuela--and the Germans were the ones that wanted to collect the debt.

The construction of the Panama Canal--with an investment equivalent to one-third of the U.S. budget in 1914--was a sign of U.S. expansion and a motive for widening its arc of defense. U.S. presidents became preoccupied with protecting this strategic asset from the region's instability and other foreign powers--to the extent that some historians referred to our entire policy toward the Caribbean Basin as "the Panama policy."[2]

Still, there were many different ways to defend the Panama Canal and U.S. interests in Latin America during the 20th century. Theodore Roosevelt and Elihu Root, his secretary of state, tried to preclude revolution by international treaties. William Howard Taft used Marines, dollars, and customs receiverships to help the countries remain solvent and stable. Woodrow Wilson replaced "dollar diplomacy" with the promotion of liberty but, like his predecessors, he continued to use the Marines. During the protectorate period, U.S. Marines intervened more than 20 times in the Caribbean area--repeatedly in Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Panama, Nicaragua, and Mexico.

On the eve of the First World War, U.S. fears of German activities in the region intensified. On July 29, 1915, President Wilson ordered U.S. Marines to occupy Haiti. "Though it [the United States] did not need and it did not want such a coaling station [in Haiti], it could not permit a European government to secure one," wrote a former secretary of state to a Senate committee investigating the intervention. "The indications were that Germany intended to obtain one unless she was prevented from doing so by the United States."[3]

In 1916, the United States occupied the Dominican Republic, and on March 8, 1917, one month before the United States declared war against Germany, American forces intervened again to prevent civil war in Cuba. The stated cause of these interventions was instability in each country, and the purpose was to promote democracy, but the sense of urgency in the United States related more to events in Europe than in the Caribbean.
If the Spanish-American War heralded the arrival of the United States as the preeminent power in the Caribbean Basin, then the end of the First World War signaled that the United States had become the leading power in the world. The European powers, preoccupied with their own recovery, withdrew or sharply reduced their already limited economic and diplomatic presence in the Caribbean Basin. No power stood in the way of the United States. Realist theories would argue that the United States would maintain and expand its presence in the region and around the world, but the opposite happened. The U.S. Senate rejected involvement in the international institutions that Woodrow Wilson helped construct, and the 1920 election confirmed an America yearning for "normalcy" and isolation. The United States also disengaged gradually from the Caribbean, although this was also due to interventions in the region proving more costly and less effective.

Just as the interventions tended to follow a similar pattern so too did the exits. The Marines first helped establish an "apolitical" military guard. Then, with some difficulty and military assistance, U.S. diplomats supervised elections that legitimized a government. Most U.S. diplomats recognized the shallowness of the new "democracies" and the threats that the new armies might try to seize power, but Washington decided to withdraw the Marines, and with one momentary reversal--in Nicaragua in 1925--U.S. soldiers went home, beginning in 1921 and ending in 1934.
The Good Neighbor PolicyIn an article in Foreign Affairs in 1928, Franklin D. Roosevelt criticized the interventions of the previous decades: "By what right . . . other than the right of main force, does the United States arrogate unto itself the privilege of intervening alone in the internal affairs of another sovereign Republic? . . . Single-handed intervention by us in the internal affairs of other nations must end."[4] Elected president four years later, Roosevelt used his inaugural address to repeat his promise to Latin America to dismantle the old protectorate system and replace it with a new "good neighbor" policy.

In practice, Roosevelt's policy had three components.[5] First, he pledged non-intervention in the internal affairs of Latin America. He withdrew the Marines from the remaining countries in which they were still based and repealed the dreaded Platt Treaties. Although Secretary of State Cordell Hull's statement on non-intervention at the Montevideo Conference is often cited as the beginning of the policy, the real test was passed by Hull and Roosevelt in 1933 when they rejected at three different times the recommendation of U.S. Ambassador to Havana Sumner Welles to land Marines in Cuba, allegedly to protect American citizens, but really to control political events.[6] One of the consequences of accepting the principle of non-intervention, however, was that it removed the principal impediment--the United States--from the path to power by military dictators like Anastasio Somoza of Nicaragua, Fulgencio Batista of Cuba, and Rafael Trujillo of the Dominican Republic.

The second element of the policy was freer trade by Reciprocal Trade Agreements. As Congressman and Senator, Cordell Hull had been a vigorous advocate for free trade for many years, and he gave it highest priority when appointed secretary of state. With much of the world divided into trading blocs, the one region with the most countries eligible for such agreements was Latin America, and, as a result, by 1945, 16 of the 22 bilateral trade agreements signed by the United States were with hemispheric governments.

The third element of the Good Neighbor Policy was a systematic effort by the United States to consult with its Latin neighbors. Even before the storm clouds of war gathered over Europe, Roosevelt and Hull took the inter-American conferences seriously. The investment paid off when war began. Except Argentina, the region gave virtually complete support to U.S. war aims.

After Roosevelt died and the war ended, the broad outlines of the Good Neighbor Policy were maintained by President Harry Truman. Truman made a few changes, e.g., experimenting briefly with a more active policy to promote democracy and distance the United States from dictators. The Truman administration also took the lead in establishing a collective security structure, first in the Rio Pact of 1947, and the next year with the Pact of Bogota that established the Organization of American States (OAS). These institutions formalized the consultative process that Roosevelt and Hull had pursued in the pre-war period.

The Cold War
While some U.S. government officials were concerned about the spread of Communism in Latin America in the 1940s, the first serious intrusion of the Cold War occurred in Guatemala where the Eisenhower administration covertly tried to unseat the leftist Arbenz government in June 1954. As a colonel in the army, Jacobo Arbenz and several of his colleagues overthrew dictator Jorge Ubico in 1944. A free election brought Juan Jose Arevalo to power as president, and he undertook a program of reforms that unsettled the conservative establishment in the country. Arbenz was elected in 1951, and with the support of the Communist Party, he accelerated reforms into ever more sensitive areas, including the inequitable land tenure system.

The Truman administration was worried about Communist influence, and at one time the president had approved a covert plan coordinated by United Fruit Company officials to overthrow Arbenz. When Secretary of State Dean Acheson learned of the plan, however, he convinced Truman to drop it. The Eisenhower administration pursued a more vigorous anti-Communist posture both at home and abroad, and its officials saw the threat more seriously than its predecessor. The U.S. ambassador urged Arbenz to dismiss Communist party members from his government. A proud nationalist, who was dependent on the leftists for ideas and political support, Arbenz refused.[7] The United States imposed an embargo on arms sales to the regime, and when a shipment of arms sailing to Guatemala from Eastern Europe was discovered, Eisenhower authorized a covert plan to overthrow Arbenz. The plan failed, but it catalyzed the Guatemalan military, already suspicious and alienated from the president, to take action against him.

The coup's significance was the message it conveyed across Latin America that the United States would not tolerate leftists--even if they came to power by free election--and that it would work closely with right-wing dictators like Somoza in order to stop Communism. This had the unfortunate effect of reducing the political space for democrats, encouraging leftists to revolt, and rightists to suppress any dissent.
Fidel Castro learned another lesson from Guatemala, one that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director Allen Dulles did not grasp until the failure of the Bay of Pigs. After coming to power, Castro replaced the military with his own guerrilla army. Within a year, the U.S. government began a program aimed at overthrowing or assassinating Castro. These failed, and Castro consolidated power.

Nonetheless, the fear of "more Cubas" led President Eisenhower and then Kennedy to propose "Marshall Plan-type" schemes to facilitate the region's development. After resisting the idea of international commodity agreements and the establishment of the Inter-American Development Bank, Eisenhower finally accepted both in his last year in office. Kennedy's bold ten-year, $10 billion foreign aid program to Latin America, the Alliance for Progress, was aimed to foster development, support social and land reforms, and reinforce democracy. While it did not achieve its high expectations, it did energize the region in important ways.

The fear of Communism also led President Kennedy to pursue projects begun in the last year of the Eisenhower administration to try to remove dictators who were near Cuba and felt to be vulnerable to Cuban-backed insurgencies. In Haiti, "Papa Doc" Duvalier outlasted President Kennedy. In the Dominican Republic, CIA-supported conspirators assassinated Rafael Trujillo in May 1961. Within a year, an election was held, but the new President Juan Bosch was overthrown seven months later. In April 1965, civil war broke out as Bosch's followers tried to retake power. President Johnson sent 22,000 soldiers. While the Dominican Republic did not become another Cuba, most scholars of the intervention conclude that this was never likely; the only outcome with a high probability was that U.S. intervention would severely damage U.S. relations with Latin America, as it did.[8]

Within a year of the intervention, and for more than a decade, American attention was diverted away from the Caribbean to war in Vietnam and the Middle East, and detente with the Soviet Union. By 1977, however, the United States could no longer ignore the resentment in Panama over obsolete Canal treaties, and Jimmy Carter took the unpopular decision of revising those treaties and modernizing U.S. relations with that small country.[9] Carter also reoriented U.S. relations with the third world to place a high priority on human rights. The policy impelled dictators to release thousands of political prisoners in Haiti, Cuba, and elsewhere, and helped consolidate democracy in the Dominican Republic. An attempt to engage the Cuban government made some progress, particularly in the release of 3,000 political prisoners, but Cuba's expansionist ambitions in Africa precluded any further progress in the relationship.

The Carter administration also sought to fill the security vacuum that opened as the British departed the Caribbean. Beginning in 1962 and continuing through the 1980s, twelve small English-speaking islands or territories in or on the Caribbean became independent. The new nations were vulnerable, and Carter responded by launching the Caribbean Group for Cooperation in Economic Development under the auspices of the World Bank. The Caribbean Group was composed of 30 nations and 15 international institutions, and within four years it quadrupled the aid given to the region and coordinated it to encourage integration.
Nonetheless, a leftist coup occurred in 1979, almost by accident, in the small, English-speaking country of Grenada. The National Security Council met the day after the coup and decided to reinforce Grenada's uneasy neighbors. When Great Britain and the other islands decided to recognize the new regime based on its pledge to hold early and free elections, the United States accepted their approach, but decided to keep a watchful eye on the regime.[10] Relations soon deteriorated because the regime did not keep its pledge and imported arms covertly from Cuba, but the Carter policy aimed to help Grenada's neighbors rather than to try to undermine or overthrow the regime.

The Carter administration anticipated the revolution in Nicaragua, but, despite considerable efforts, failed to prevent it. The Sandinista guerrillas were viewed by the administration as Marxists and anti-American, but the Somoza regime was indefensible and, indeed, was viewed as the cause of the problem. Therefore, the Carter administration first tried to liberalize the regime; then it mediated differences with the opposition under an OAS multilateral umbrella. When Somoza rejected the mediation, the Carter administration imposed sanctions.
The Sandinistas enjoyed widespread support throughout Latin America, and when the United States in June 1979 tried to gain agreements in the OAS to depose Somoza but interpose an inter-American peace force, most of the Latin American leaders accepted the first and rejected the second. Carter decided not to act alone, and the Sandinistas took power on July 20, 1979. The United States then worked with its friends in the region to provide aid to the Sandinista regime in the hope of moderating it. This strategy showed mixed results until the fall of 1980 when the Sandinistas decided to ignore warnings from Washington and support the leftist insurgency in El Salvador. When this was discovered in the last days of the Carter administration, the United States suspended economic aid to the regime.[11]

The Nicaraguan and Grenadian revolutions were joined in the minds of some Americans with the Iranian revolution and the taking of American diplomats as hostages, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the Soviet-Cuban intervention in Ethiopia. These events increased America's frustration, and no one articulated the apprehension better than Ronald Reagan in the 1980 campaign.

The change in policies toward the Caribbean Basin from Carter to Reagan was as dramatic a shift as the United States had seen between two presidents in the twentieth century. While the Carter administration started with an interest in promoting economic development in the Caribbean but eventually returned to a concern for national security, the Reagan administration, reflecting a more traditional approach, made the same journey in the opposite direction. But this understates the different points of departure of the two presidents.

The Carter administration placed a high priority on multilateral approaches to security problems and respecting the sovereignty of small nations. President Reagan believed that the East-West struggle was paramount, and the small nations were important only to the extent that they were allies or enemies in this wider struggle. Reagan viewed "instability [as] being inflicted on some countries in the Caribbean by Cuba and the Soviet Union." As he told the Wall Street Journal in 1980: "The Soviet Union underlies all the unrest that is going on. If they weren't engaged in this game of dominoes, there wouldn't be any hot spots in the world."

Reagan adopted a very confrontational approach to Grenada, and in October 1983, when one faction of the revolutionary government attacked another, he joined with six Caribbean nations to invade the island, arrest the revolutionaries, and restore a democratic government to power. The centerpiece of his East-West strategy in the region was his support for the Salvadoran government and the Nicaraguan contras. As with President Kennedy, however, Reagan was sensitive to criticism that his anti-Communist strategy lacked a positive component, and so he fashioned a development program, the Caribbean Basin Initiative, and institutions, such as the National Endowment for Democracy, to promote democracy.

George Bush adopted a less ideological and belligerent approach than his predecessor. The Bipartisan Accord, negotiated by Secretary of State James A. Baker and Speaker of the House Jim Wright stopped military aid to the contras long enough to permit real negotiations to move forward. With the support of the Central American presidents, and the active mediation of the OAS, the United Nations (U.N.), and the Council of Freely Elected Heads of Government, chaired by former U.S. President Carter, Nicaragua held a free election in February 1990, which foreclosed the contra war and permitted the first peaceful transfer of power in Nicaragua from an incumbent to his adversary in the country's history.
The Post-Cold War EpochIn the Caribbean Basin, no conflict was solved automatically as a result of the implosion of the Soviet Union. The Nicaraguan conflict was resolved because the U.S. Congress rejected military aid to the contras, the Arias Plan provided a framework for negotiations, and Carter, the OAS, and the U.N. mediated a crucial election. The Salvadoran conflict was resolved because of U.N. mediation with U.S. support. But the Guatemalan and Colombian conflicts continued long after the Soviet Union disappeared, and Cuba used all of its energies to survive.

Although there was no longer a Soviet security threat in the hemisphere, the Bush administration intervened in Panama in 1989, and the Clinton administration intervened in Haiti in 1994.

General Manuel Antonio Noriega had been an ally of the Reagan administration in its war against the Sandinistas in Nicaragua, but in June 1987 a senior Panamanian military officer accused Noriega of killing a political leader, manipulating the 1984 election, and being deeply involved in drug-trafficking. President Reagan suspended aid and imposed sanctions. In the summer of 1988 the Reagan administration negotiated Noriega's departure, but it retreated from a deal because George Bush's previous association with Noriega was a political liability in an election year.

In May 1989, former President Carter observed the elections and denounced Noriega when he tried to manipulate them. The OAS foreign ministers then met and condemned Noriega's actions and tried unsuccessfully to negotiate his departure. In October 1989, the Bush administration hesitated to support a group of rebel officers who tried to seize power from General Noriega because of uncertainty as to the identity and goals of the coup plotters. Bush's failure to act proved an embarrassment, however, and so when a second opportunity presented itself in mid-December, the Bush administration decided to take advantage of it by intervening on December 20, 1989. There were three goals: to arrest Noriega and bring him to justice in the United States; to protect U.S. citizens (some of whom had been attacked by the Panamanian military); and to restore democracy. All three goals were achieved, but as the first unilateral military intervention in Latin America in 65 years, the invasion in Panama was roundly condemned in the OAS and the U.N., and, significantly, its impact was felt as far as Moscow. When Secretary of State James A. Baker visited the Soviet Parliament two months later, a Latvian Deputy told him:
"I don't want to speak about the norms that the United States violated in Panama, but . . . you must have weighed the positive and the negative in taking these decisions. I would like to inform you of one negative aspect that you did not take into account.

In this country, we also have our hawks and doves, and the actions of the United States in Panama provided additional arguments to our hawks, especially after the Summit Meeting in Malta left the impression that our relations had undergone a qualitative change, and then all of a sudden your intervention in Panama happened. There is no question that this will complicate our Parliament's consideration of our proposal to proceed along the road of disarmament."[12] The circumstances surrounding the question of intervention in Haiti had a few points of similarity but many more differences with the other post-Cold War case. As in Panama, the precipitating issue concerned the legitimacy of the government. In December 1990, after numerous false starts, and in the presence of large numbers of observers from Carter's Council, the OAS, and the U.N., Haiti held a successful election in which Jean-Bertrand Aristide won by a large margin. On September 30, 1991, the military overthrew him and sent him into exile.

The OAS condemned the coup and recommended an embargo and diplomatic isolation. Jamaican Prime Minister Michael Manley told Secretary Baker that the Caribbean would support a military effort to restore Aristide. After stemming the flow of refugees, however, and in the midst of a presidential election in which his lack of attention to domestic issues was a liability, President Bush decided to put the Haiti issue aside.
During the presidential campaign, Bill Clinton criticized President George Bush for repatriating the Haitian refugees, but after the November election, Clinton was persuaded to maintain the same policy, fearing that a change could unleash a flood of new refugees. At the same time, he earned Aristide's support for the policy by promising that he would use all his influence to assure Aristide's return to power. This promise was apparently made without consideration of its consequences and, as a result, U.S. rhetorical support for Aristide's return was not supported by U.S. actions. In October 1993, a U.S. ship bringing U.N. security forces to the island was not permitted to land in Port-au-Prince, and the embarrassment of turning the ship around compelled the Clinton administration to consider military action. The president, however, decided against it then.

In July 1994, the U.N. Security Council passed a Resolution permitting the use of force by member states to ensure Haitian military compliance with past U.N. resolutions calling for the restoration of constitutional government. On September 15, President Clinton warned the Haitian military leaders to step down from power immediately. Although he announced that all diplomatic options were exhausted, none had been explored in the previous six months, and, at the last minute, he asked former President Carter, Senator Sam Nunn, and General Colin Powell to negotiate the departure of the Haitian military leaders.

The Carter team succeeded in gaining the agreement of the provisional government for the entry into Haiti of a large multinational force led by the United States. On September 19, the day after the agreement was signed, 20,000 U.S. forces arrived to create a secure climate that would permit the restoration of President Aristide and the consolidation of democracy in Haiti.

Patterns of Intervention and Non-Intervention

Let us review seven cases of U.S. intervention in the Caribbean Basin in the post-World War II period (see Table 1).
Table 1

Case: Not to Intervene- Intervene Indirectly -Invade
1. Guatemala 1951 1954- No
2. Cuba 1958 1960, - 1961 - 1962
3. Dominican Republic 1960, 1961- 1965
4. Nicaragua 1979 1981- 1987
5. Grenada 1979, 1981- 1983
6. Panama Oct. 1989 - Dec.1989
7. Haiti Dec.91, Oct. 93- 1915, Sept. 94, Fev. 04

Jan.94. Jul.94

To understand the key patterns, one needs first to distinguish between direct intervention by U.S. forces and indirect intervention by supporting local or third-country forces. Secondly, one wants to distinguish between the decision to intervene and the decision not to intervene.

The question of what motivated U.S. policymakers to intervene in the Cold War period yields an unsurprising answer--fear of the spread of Communism. Legitimate questions can be raised as to whether the fear was justified in particular cases, whether the response was appropriate, and whether other concerns, e.g., business interests or democracy, were also important. But an intensive analysis of the five Cold War cases suggests that U.S. policymakers acted to prevent the spread of

Communist influence.
There are two more interesting questions, however, than the one of motives during the Cold War. First, what were the reasons for not intervening during the Cold War?; and second, what were the motives for intervention in the post-Cold War period?

Table 1 probably omits many moments in the post-war period when the president's advisors broached the issue of intervention, and the president rejected that option. The decisions that we know the president made not to intervene occurred in crises in Guatemala in 1951, Cuba in 1958, Nicaragua in 1979, and Grenada in 1979 and 1981. As one looks at the broader sweep of U.S. foreign policy, the differences between Democratic and Republican approaches seem less significant. Democratic presidents chose not to intervene in Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Grenada; Republican Presidents chose not to intervene in Cuba in 1958 and Grenada in 1981. A similar pattern holds for the decision to intervene.
In the cases of non-intervention, the level of perceived threat was quite low, and there was little public awareness of the crisis. The president evidently believed that it would be difficult for him to justify military intervention. In each of these cases, the "enemies" did not describe themselves as Marxists or Communists, but they were "leftists." Moreover, the countries were small, and far bigger crises were preoccupying the United States at the time. In the case of Nicaragua, President Carter knew that his Latin American allies would strongly oppose intervention against the Sandinistas as they were supporting them at the time. In the other cases, the principal constraint was simply the president's conscience and the American body politic.

The fact that the issue of intervention was broached made it easier for the president to consider indirect--and in a few cases, direct--intervention the next time. This was particularly true in the three most recent cases.
The business of identifying a single motive to a complicated national decision is not an easy assignment. In the Panamanian case during the post-Cold War era, in December 1989, the United States had interests in maintaining an open Panama Canal, protecting American citizens, and restoring democracy, but the Canal was not endangered, and there is reason to believe that American citizens would be threatened more by the invasion than without. Certainly, the personal embarrassment felt by President Bush because of his previous associations with Noriega was a contributing factor.

In the case of Haiti, the United States was initially motivated by a fear of refugees. When this concern was alleviated, the pressure to intervene diminished. Over time, however, President Clinton built multilateral support for intervention, and although he did not favor this option initially, he almost left himself no other option at the end. Still, the decision to forge an international coalition to restore democracy in Haiti was an unprecedented contribution to the construction of a collective defense of democracy.

An additional reason for both interventions was presidential credibility and fear of embarrassment. Both Bush and Clinton had pledged to rid themselves of the problem and a previous effort (in Panama, in October 1989; and in Haiti, in October 1993) had failed. Their credibility was at stake.

The factor of presidential credibility was also important during the Cold War. In the case of Grenada, the interesting question is not: why did President Reagan invade in 1983?; but rather why he did not invade in 1981. There was never any doubt that a U.S. invasion of that small island would be no more difficult than the takeover of Martha's Vineyard. But in 1981, a U.S. invasion would have been condemned by everyone, including Grenada's closest neighbors. In 1983, the execution of several Grenadian political leaders so repulsed the democratic leaders of the region that they changed their implicit veto of U.S. actions into an invitation. Still, the decision for the United States to invade needed other reasons. Although the U.S. medical students were in no danger of becoming hostages, some in the administration feared that could happen. Half-way across the world, the suicide bombing of the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut provided a need to show that the United States could "stand tall" again.

Perhaps the motive is less important than the consequence of intervention--both for the country and the international community. In both cases, the post-Cold War intervention was positive in terms of improving the lives of the vast majority of the people of Panama and Haiti. The two interventions had different effects on international law and the wider community. In the case of Panama, the intervention was condemned as a unilateral violation of international law; in the case of Haiti, the intervention contributed to a broadening of international law as it had been sanctioned by U.N. Resolution.

The Ebbs and Flows of the Whirlpool: Defining Ends and Means The process by which the United States Government makes the decision to intervene or not to intervene had been restricted generally to the president and his closest advisors in the confines of the National Security Council. Congress and public opinion are important to the decision, but in a very indirect manner. The president must calculate the effect of his decisions on Congress and the American people, but he rarely consults with more than a handful of Senators or Congressmen.

The decision of whether to go to war is one of those that sit on one end of the spectrum of Executive-Legislative decisionmaking. At the other end are amendments to the foreign aid law where Congress has primary responsibility, and the president is often on the edges trying to find a niche to influence the outcome.

During the 20th century, U.S. policies toward the Caribbean Basin have been anchored to a set of interests which have changed much less than the strategies formulated to pursue them. The motive for U.S. engagement sometimes has been altruistic--to promote democracy or development--but more often it has been fear, a disproportionate fear for such a large power in such a small sea, but a fear nonetheless that events could turn hostile to U.S. interests. It follows that American foreign policy in the Caribbean always has seemed to err on the anxious side. In the 19th century, the United States was anxious to prevent "another Haiti," an independent black republic. In the early 20th century, the United States was anxious to prevent governments in the region from defaulting to European creditors lest that be used as a pretext for European intervention. During the Second World War, the United States was anxious to keep out Nazi Germany, and after that, Soviet Russia. After the Soviets turned up 90 miles offshore, the United States became anxious to avoid "another Cuba."

Beyond this elemental security interest, the United States has also tried, at different times, to promote human rights, democracy, social reforms, and economic development. U.S. national interests are not immutable; they have changed over time, sometimes so slowly as to not be perceptible. For example, the Panama Canal is no longer a vital asset to the United States, although it remains vital for Panama. With the advent of aircraft carriers, which are too large to transit the canal, U.S. interests in the canal changed from being strategic to being primarily economic--from permitting the U.S. fleet to move rapidly between oceans to providing a marginal economic advantage in the shipment of supplies.
U.S. interests do not change radically from one administration to the next, but the value and priority that each administration attaches to these interests often changes quite markedly. Both Carter and Reagan, for example, promoted U.S. interests in human rights, but Carter gave a much higher priority than did Reagan. Both wanted to prevent Communist inroads in the hemisphere, but Reagan saw the threat as so dire that he was willing to support armies that committed atrocities.
Franklin D. Roosevelt, Harry Truman, and Jimmy Carter pledged non-intervention and meant it. Dwight D. Eisenhower, John F. Kennedy, Lyndon Johnson, Richard Nixon, Ronald Reagan, and George Bush violated their pledges of non-intervention because they perceived serious threats to U.S. security. Kennedy, Carter, Reagan, and Bush all proposed development programs in the area, although none had enough of an impact to lift the region up to the level of sustainable development.
Presidents defined U.S. interests differently; they also chose different means to defend them. Carter and Bush were more willing to consider multilateral approaches than Reagan, while Bush and Reagan gave more emphasis to military aid, invasions, and covert actions than Carter.
Opening Spheres of InfluenceWhere colonialism or imperialism were not options, major powers have asserted "spheres of influence"--areas of vital interest where sovereignty was grudgingly recognized, deviant behavior was proscribed, and other powers were unwelcome. When respected, such spheres reduced confrontations between major powers; conflict was not necessarily diminished, but it was contained within and among small nations.

Winston Churchill and Joseph Stalin thought Franklin Roosevelt's vision of a world order without spheres of influence was quixotic. Privately, the two of them negotiated quotas of influence in Eastern Europe. Since the late 1940s, both the Soviet Union and the United States rejected each other's right to a sphere, even while asserting its own rights. Stalin secured his sphere in Eastern Europe. The United States secured its sphere in Latin America by negotiating the Rio Pact in 1947, by establishing the OAS in 1948, and, later, by covert actions.
U.S. critics noted the contradiction, if not the hypocrisy, between condemning Soviet control of Eastern Europe and asserting it in the western hemisphere, but only after Gorbachev could a Russian citizen match this self-criticism and write: "We rejected the concept of a division of spheres of influence in `theory' yet pursued it in practice."[14] The Brezhnev Doctrine, which asserted the right of the Soviet Union to compel its neighbors to remain Communist regardless of their preferences, made the Monroe Doctrine seem modest in comparison.
The Soviets were acutely sensitive to the slightest diminution of their control in Eastern Europe; the United States allowed more space for internal change but drew a line to preclude Marxist governments in Latin America. The hotter the Cold War, the more determined each superpower became to avoid any encroachments.
By letting Eastern Europe go its own way ("the Sinatra doctrine"), Gorbachev opened the door to the most profound, peaceful transformations in the postwar period. Within one year, free elections brought democratic, non-Communist governments to power in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and East Germany. Though the people in each of these countries had deep-seated anti-Soviet fears, which had been one of the reasons why Gorbachev's predecessors had been so loath to let go, the new governments were less anti-Soviet than his predecessors had expected.

A similar dynamic was at work in Central America. After a decade of U.S.-supported war in Nicaragua, the Sandinistas and many others thought their best political assets were the U.S.-backed contras, nationalism, and anti-Americanism. But the Nicaraguan people voted overwhelmingly for Violeta de Chamorro in part because they expected her to improve relations with the United States.

This is not to suggest that nationalism and anti-Americanism are spent forces in Latin America. Hardly. The new wave of democrats in the region have been pragmatists, but the next wave might very well be nationalists. Much depends on whether the current generation succeeds and how the United States responds. The history of U.S. relations with Latin America can be viewed as a grudging acceptance by the United States of the region's autonomy and a gradual recognition by Latin Americans that they were partly responsible for their own division and for inviting foreign intervention. The Cold War was just the most recent episode. U.S.-Russian cooperation has stopped exacerbating the region's conflicts, but these can only be resolved locally. The long-standing connection between civil war and foreign intervention will always be a danger in a region of small, open, vulnerable nations so close to the world's most powerful until definitive steps are taken to sever that tie.
In September 1989, Eduard Shevardnadze, then Soviet foreign minister, outlined a world without spheres in a speech to the U.N.:

"It is no secret that we were not enthusiastic about the election setback of the Polish Communists. . . . Nevertheless, we see nothing threatening in the fact that in accordance with the will of the Polish people a coalition government has been formed . . . Tolerance is the norm of civilized behavior. But if it is
obligatory for us in our attitude toward the Government of Poland, why are others so intolerant toward, for example, Cuba? . . . The days of traditional demarcation lines are numbered."
[15] The Soviet Union long trailed behind the United States in its lack of respect for self-determination on its periphery. In denying that his country had any moral or political right to interfere in the affairs of its East European neighbors, however, Gorbachev leaped far ahead of the United States. Before Gorbachev's daring move, President Bush took two steps backwards, stating his intention to help "the Soviets understand that we have very special interests in this hemisphere, particularly in Central America, and . . . I don't think they really have substantive interests in this part of the world, certainly none that rival ours."[16]
Like the aftermath of the first and second world wars, the end of the Cold War provides an opportunity for the international community to build new institutions and invigorate old ones. The aim should be to develop rules that restrain unilateral intervention but strengthen collective responsibility and action on behalf of peace and democracy. If the rules can secure each nation from outside intervention or inside subversion, then instability would no longer become a cause for tension by outside powers. Rather it would trigger collective mediation and action.
The heavy, negative weight of the Cold War has been lifted. But the hemisphere won't escape the whirlpool until it understands that the central dilemma was not a function of the East-West conflict; more than anything, it was due to the chronic instability and vulnerability of the small nations of the region. If a group felt that its access to power was blocked, it would almost always seek support from outside. In the Caribbean, that meant either the United States or, if it were already supporting the government, then its enemy. Thus, internal strife was connected to international intervention.

Many condemned Washington, Moscow, or Havana for this predicament, but the real culprit was the absence of a framework for securing peaceful political change and the lack of resources to help nations improve the lives of their people. The way to untie the gordian knot connecting internal conflict with international intervention is by forging a new collective defense of democracy within a broader arrangement that will assist the process of development and the pursuit of social justice.
If governments in the region do not realize they are currently on the rim of the whirlpool, then they will find themselves recaptured someday. If they develop a strategy to preserve democracy and sustain development, then they can escape to a truly new world.

[*]Robert A. Pastor is a professor of political science at Emory University, and director of the Latin American and Caribbean Program at The Carter Center. He was director of Latin American affairs on the National Security Council from 1977-1981.

[1] Robert A. Pastor, Whirlpool: U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Latin America and the Caribbean, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992. [2] Samuel Flagg Bemis, The Latin American Policy of the United States, New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1943, pp. 185-89.
[3] Letter from Robert Lansing, former secretary of state, to Senator Medill McCormick, chairman of the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Haiti and Santo Domingo, May 4, 1922, in James W. Gantenbein, ed., The Evolution of Our Latin American Policy: A Documentary Record, New York: Octagon Books, 1971, p. 636.
[4] Franklin D. Roosevelt, "Our Foreign Policy: A Democratic View," Foreign Affairs, July 6, 1928, pp. 584-85.
[5] See Irwin F. Gellman, Good Neighbor Diplomacy: United States Policies in Latin America, 1933-1945, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979; and Bryce Wood, The Making of the Good Neighbor Policy, New York: Columbia University Press, 1961.
[6] For an excellent account of U.S. policy toward Cuba when Welles was ambassador, see Bryce Wood, The Making of The Good Neighbor Policy, New York: Columbia University Press, 1961, Chapters 2 and 3.
[7] The literature on the Guatemalan revolution is diverse in interpretation. The best recent book that incorporates much of the evidence of the previous works is by Piero Gleijeses, Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution and the United States, 1944-1954, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991.
[8] See Abraham F. Lowenthal, The Dominican Intervention, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972.
[9] For an analysis of the Carter, Reagan, and Bush administrations, see Robert A. Pastor, Whirlpool: U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Latin America and the Caribbean, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992, Chapters 3-5.
[10] For a full description of U.S. policy and U.S.-Grenadian relations during the Carter and Reagan administrations, see Chapter 8 of my book, Whirlpool: U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Latin America and the Caribbean.
[11] For a full development of U.S.-Nicaraguan relations, see my Condemned to Repetition: The United States and Nicaragua, Princeton University Press, 1987.
[12] Quoted in Thomas Friedman, "Baker Braves the Gauntlet in the Moscow Parliament," New York Times, February 11, 1990, p. 20.
[13] During the Missile Crisis, the Kennedy administration made a tentative decision to invade Cuba if the quarantine failed.
[14] Andrey V. Kozyrev, "What Soviet Foreign Policy Went Sour," New York Times, January 7, 1989, p. 17.
[15] Excerpts in New York Times, September 27, 1989.
[16] "President's News Conference," reprinted in New York Times, February 7, 1989, p. 34.

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