JustimaBlogspot Open University: Haiti's Hail to the Chief- L'Hymne Présidentiel d'Haïti

Haiti's Hail to the Chief- L'Hymne Présidentiel Haïtien

"Quand nos Aïeux brisèrent leurs entraves"
(When our Fathers broke their Chains)

Words by: Oswald Durand
Music by: Occide JeantyIn use: 1893-1903

In 1893 a visiting warship to the Haitian capital was required by protocol to perform the Haitian anthem. Since Haiti did not yet have an anthem, the composer Occide Jeanty offered to compose music for the patriotic poem "Quand nos Aïeux brisèrent leurs entraves."















This was completed that night and the anthem was debuted aboard the ship. It remained as an unofficial national anthem until a new one was chosen to mark Haiti's centennial on January 1, 1904. The former anthem still remains in use as a presidential salute.

The Next Generation of Presidential Leaders























HAITI's National Palace

Special thanks to: Jan Scotland for some of this information.
and to http://www.nationalanthems.info/ht-03.htm

FRENCH LYRICS
Quand nos Aïeux brisèrent leurs entraves
Ce n'était pas pour se croiser les bras
Pour travailler en maîtres les esclaves
Ont embrassé corps à corps le trépas.
Leur sang à flots engraissa nos collines,
A notre tour, jaunes et noirs, allons!
Creusons le sol légué par Dessalines :
Notre fortune est là dans nos vallons.

CHORUS:
L'indépendance est éphémère
Sans le droit à l'égalité!
Pour fouler, heureux, cette terre
Il nous faut la devise austère :
Dieu! Le Travail! La Liberté!

Quoi de plus beau que ces fils de l'Afrique
Qui, trois cent ans dans tous les maux plongés,
Tournent leurs fers, leur carcan et leur trique
Contre la force et les vieux préjugés!
En bas voyez! c'est la noble bannière
Cernant les noirs qui vont mourir là-haut
Non! leur torrent avec Lamartinière
Descend fougueux à la Crête-à-Pierrot.

CHORUS:
Tout cela serait éphémère
Sans le droit à l'égalité!
Pour fouler, heureux, cette terre
Il nous faut la devise austère :
Dieu! Le Travail! La Liberté!

De Rochambeau les cohortes altières,
Quelques instants, suspendirent le feu
Pour saluer le Héros de Vertières,
Capois-la-Mort, grand comme un demi-dieu.
Vers le progrès crions comme ce brave :
"Noirs, en avant! En avant!" Et bêchons
Le sol trempé des sueurs de l'esclave!
Nous avons là ce qu'ailleurs nous cherchons

CHORUS:
Sans quoi tout devient éphémère
Pas d'ordre et pas de liberté
Pour fouler, heureux, cette terre
Il nous faut la devise austère :
Dieu! Le Travail! La Liberté!

Sang des martyrs dont la pourpre écumante
A secoué nos chaînes et nos jougs!
Chavanne, Ogé, sur la route infamante,
Toi, vieux Toussaint, dans ton cachot de Joux
O précurseurs, dont les dernières fibres
Ont dû frémir, - vous les porte-flambeaux -
En nous voyant maintenant fiers et libres,
Conseillez-nous du fond de vos tombeaux!

CHORUS:
Votre bonheur est éphémère;
Ayez droit à l’égalité!
Pour fouler, heureux, cette terre,
Il vous faut la devise austère:
Dieu! Le travail! La liberté!

A l’oeuvre donc, descendants de l’Afrique,
Jaunes et noirs, fils du même berceau!
L’antique Europe et la jeune Amérique
Nous voient de loin tenter le rude assaut.
Bêchons le sol qu’en l’an mil huit cent quatre,
Nous ont conquis nos aïeux au bras fort.
C’est notre tour à présent de combattre
Avec ce cri: "Le progrès ou la mort!"

CHORUS:
A l’oeuvre! Ou tout est éphémère!
Ayons droit à l’égalité!
Nous foulerons, plus fiers, la terre,
Avec cette devise austère:
Dieu! Le travail! La liberté!

---
ENGLISH TRANSLATION
When our fathers broke their chains
this was not to fold their arms
and to let slaves work for them as masters
Side by side, till death.
Their streams of blood soaked our hills
But now our turn came, Brown and Black, onward!
Plough the soil of Dessalines:
Our wealth is here in our small valleys.

CHORUS:
Independence is fugitive,(elusive, short-lived, passing blip)
without the right of equality!
To plough (cheerfully) this soil with joy
we (must have) need this strict motto:
God! (Work) Labour ! Freedom!

What can there be more beautiful than this children of Africa
who, after threehundred years of deepest bondage cast,
turned iron, yoke and truncheon
against the hostile powers and against old prejudices!
See from down there! It is the noble banner,
that unites the Blacks, who are ready to die there at the top!
But no! The crowds of Lamartinière
descend like foaming flood from La Crête-à-Pierrot.

CHORUS:
Everything is fugitive (elusive, short-lived, passing blips)
without the right of equality!
To plough (cheerfully) this soil with joy
we (must uphold) need this strict motto:
God! (Work) Labour! Freedom!

The proud troops of Rochambeau
suspended fire for a moment
To salute the hero of Vertières
Capois-la-Mort, great as a second god.
Towards progress, cries the brave:
"Blacks, onward! Onward!" and plough
this soil, which is soaked with the sweat of slaves!
It is here, what we were hoping for to find it somewhere else.

CHORUS:
Without this everything is fugitive (elusive, short-lived, passing blips):
Without order and freedom!
To plough (cheerfully) this soil with joy
we (must have) need this strict motto:
God! (Work)Labour! Freedom!

The purple blood of the martyrs foamed
over our chains and yokes!
Chavanne, Ogé on this horrible road
you, old Toussaint, in your prison of Joux,
and our fathers, marching ahead,
with trembling hearts - You carried the torch.
Us, who are now proud and free,
Guide us from the ground of your tombs!

CHORUS:
Your fortune is fugitive (elusive, short-lived, passing blip)
without the right of equality!
To plough (cheerfully) this soil with joy
You must (uphold) need this strict motto:
God! (Work) Labour! Freedom!

Now to work, you decendants of Africa,
Brown and Black, children from the same cradle!
The old Europe and the young America
try again to suppress us from far away.
Plough the soil, which, in the year eighteenhundred and four
our fathers conquered with strong arm.
Now it is our turn to fight,
with the cry "Progress or Death!"

CHORUS:
Now to work! Or everything is fugitive (elusive, short-lived, passing blip)!
Let's have the right of equality!
We will plough (cheerfully) this soil with even more pride
with this strict motto:
God! Labour! Freedom!


The Chiefs who have governed Haiti from 1625
Les Chefs qui ont Gouverné Haïti depuis 1625

1631 - 1634: Anthony Hilton (English governor) (d. 1634)
1633 - Jul 1652: Jean de Levassuer(d. 1652) (French governor)
1635: Nicholas Riskinner (d. 1635) (English governor)
1639 - 1640: Robert Flood (English governor)
1652 - Jan 1654: Timolén Hotman de Fontenay, chevalier de Fontenay Jan 1654 - 1655: Spanish rule

1656 - 1659: Elias Watts (English governor)

Governors of Saint-Domingue
1656 - 1662: Jérémie Deschamps,chevalier du Raussac et du Moussac
1662 - Jun 1665: Frédéric Deschamps de la Place (acting)
Jun 1665 - 1668: Bertrand Denis d’Ogeron (d. 1675) 1st time)
1668 - Jun 1669: Jacques Nepveu de Pouançay,(d. 1683)(1st time)
Jun 1669 - Feb 1673: Bertrand Denis d'Ogeron 2nd time)
Apr 1673: Jerôme du Sarrat de la Perrière acting)
Apr 1673 - 16 Mar 1675: Bertrand Denis dogtrot (3rd time)
16 Mar 1675 - Sep 1675: Louvilliers de Poincy
Sep 1675 - 1676: Pierre Paul Tarin de Cussy (d. 1691) 1st time)(acting)
1676 - 1683: Jacques Nepveu de Pouançay, (2nd time)
1683 - Apr 1684: François Depardieu de Franquesnay acting)
Apr 1684 - Jan 1691: Pierre Paul Tarin de Cussy (2nd time)(acting)
Jan 1691 - Oct 1691: Dumas (acting)
1 Oct 1691 - Jul 1700: Jean-Baptiste Ducasse (d. 1715)
Mar 1697 - May 1697: Jacques Yvon, sieur Deslandes (acting for Ducasse)
May 1697 - Jun 1697: Compte de Boissyraimé (acting for Ducasse)
Jul 1700 - 16 Dec 1703: Joseph d'Honon de Gallifet (acting)
16 Dec 1703 - 13 Feb 1705: Charles Auger (d. 1705)
13 Oct 1705 - 28 Dec 1707: Jean-Pierre de Charitte (1st time)(acting)
28 Dec 1707 - 1710: François Joseph, compte de (d. 1711) Choiseul-Beauprés.
1710 - 7 Feb 1711: Jean-Pierre de Charitte(2nd time)
7 Feb 1711 - 24 May 1711: Laurent de Valernod (d. 1711)
24 May 1711 - 29 Aug 1712: Nicolas de Gabaret (d. 1712)
29 Aug 1712 - 1713: Paul François de La Grange, (d. 1745)
1713 - Jan 1714: Louis de Courbon, (- d. 1722) Governors-general

Jan 1714 - 11 Jan 1717: Louis de Courbon, comte de Blénac
11 Jan 1717 - 10 Jul 1719: Charles Joubert de la Bastide, (d. 1722)
10 Jul 1719 - 6 Dec 1723: Léon, marquis de Sorel (d. 1743)
6 Dec 1723 - 8 Oct 1731: Gaspard Charles de Goussé
8 Oct 1731 - 4 Feb 1732: Antoine Gabriel, marquis de Vienne (d. 1732)
4 Feb 1732 - 8 Oct 1732: Étienne Cochard de Chastenoy(1st time)(acting)
8 Oct 1732 - 11 Aug 1737: Pierre, marquis de Fayet (d. 1737)
Aug 1737 - 11 Nov 1737: Étienne Cochard de Chastenoy (2nd time)(acting)
11 Nov 1737 - 19 Nov 1746: Charles de Brunier, marquis de Larnage
19 Nov 1746 - 12 Aug 1748: Étienne Cochard de Chastenoy (3rd time)
12 Aug 1748 - 29 Mar 1751: Hubert de Brienne, (d. 1777)
29 Mar 1751 - 31 May 1753: Emmanuel Auguste de Cahideux (d. 1764)
31 May 1753 - 24 Mar 1757: Joseph Hyacinthe de Rigaud, (d. 1764) marquis de Vaudreuil
24 Mar 1757 - 30 Jul 1762: Philippe François Bart (d. 1784)
30 Jul 1762 - 7 Mar 1763: Gabriel de Bory de Saint-Vincent (d. 1801)
7 Mar 1763 - 4 Aug 1763: Armand, vicompte de Belzunce (d.1763)
4 Aug 1763 - 23 Apr 1764: Pierre André de Gohin,(acting)
23 Apr 1764 - 1 Jul 1766: Jean Baptiste Charles Henri, (d. 1794) compte d'Estaing
1 Jul 1766 - 10 Feb 1769: Louis Armand Constantin de Rohan, (d. 1794)
10 Feb 1769 - 15 Jan 1772: Pierre Gédéon
15 Jan 1772 - 30 Apr 1772: De la Ferronays (acting)
30 Apr 1772 - 15 Apr 1775: Louis Florent, marquis de Valière (d. 1775)
12 May 1775 - 16 Aug 1775: Jean-François de Villeverd 1st time)(acting)
16 Aug 1775 - 13 Dec 1776: Victor Thérèse Charpentier, (d. 1776) compte d'Ennery
28 Dec 1776 - 22 May 1777: Jean-Baptiste de Taste de Lilancour(1st time) (acting)
22 May 1777 - 7 Mar 1780: Robert, (d. 1780)
7 Mar 1780 - 25 Apr 1780: Jean-Baptiste de Taste de Lilancour (2nd time) (acting)
25 Apr 1780 - 28 Jul 1781 Jean-François, de Villeverd (2nd time)
28 Jul 1781 - 14 Feb 1782: Jean-Baptiste de Taste de Lilancour(3rd time)
14 Feb 1782 - 3 Jul 1785: Guillaume Léonard de Bellecombe,(1792)
3 Jul 1785 - 27 Apr 1786: Gui Pierre de Coustard (acting)
27 Apr 1786 - Nov 1787: César Henri,(d. 1799)
Nov 1787 - 22 Dec 1788: Alexandre de Vincent de Mazade (1st time)
22 Dec 1788 - 1789: Marie Charles, marquis du Chilleau
1789: Alexandre de Vincent de Mazade (s.a.)(2nd time) (acting)
19 Aug 1789 - Nov 1790: Louis Antoine Thomassin,(d. 1790) compte de Peynier
9 Nov 1790 - 1792:Philibert François Rouxel
29 Nov 1791 - 1Apr 1792: Frédéric de Mirbeck -Commissioner
29 Nov 1791 - 18 Sep 1792: Philippe Roume de Saint- Laurent Commissioner (1st time)
1792: Adrien Nicolas, marquis de la Salle
Jun 1792 - 23 Oct 1792: Jean Jacques d'Esparbès de Lussan (d. 1810)
23 Oct 1792 - 2 Jan 1793: Donatien Marie Joseph de Vimeur, (d. 1813) :Compte de Rochambeau (1st time)

2 Jan 1793 - 19 Jun 1793: Léger Félicité Sonthonax (d. 1813) (1st time) -Commissioner
19 Jun 1793 - Oct 1793 François Galbaud du Fort
Oct 1793 - 11 May 1796: Étienne Maynaud Bizefranc

British Occupied Portion of Saint-Domingue
Military Governors 19 Sep 1793 - Oct 1794: John Whitelock (d. 1833)
Oct 1794 - May 1795: Adam Williamson (d. 1798)
Governors May 1795 - Oct 1796: Adam Williamson
Oct 1796 - 1 Jan 1797: John Graves Simcoe
1 Jan 1797 - Mar 1797: Nesbit
21 Mar 1797 - 2 Oct 1798: Thomas Maitland

Toward End of British and French Rule on 2 portions of Haiti
11 May 1796 - 24 Aug 1797: Léger Félicité Sonthonax (s.a.) (2nd time) -
Commissioner

1 Apr 1797 - 5 May 1802: Pierre François Dominique Toussaint-Louverture

27 Mar 1798 - 23 Oct 1798: Gabriel Marie Théodore-Joseph Hédouville -
Commissioner
Oct 1798 - Nov 1800: Philippe Roume de Saint-Laurent -Commissioner (2nd time)
14 Jan 1801 - 180.: Lequoy Mongiraud -Prefect
5 Feb 1802 - 2 Nov 1802: Charles Victor Emmanuel Leclerc (d. 1802)
2 Nov 1802 - 30 Nov 1803: Donatien Marie Joseph de Vimeur,
Compte de Rochambeau (2nd time)

30 Nov 1803 - 31 Dec 1803: Jean-Jacques Dessalines (b. 1758 - d. 1806)

1 Jan 1804 Independence (Haiti)

Governor-general 1 Jan 1804 - 22 Sep 1804: Jean-Jacques Dessalines (d. 1806)

Emperor 22 Sep 1804 - 17 Oct 1806: Jacques I

Provisional Chief of the Haitian Government 17 Oct 1806 - 17 Feb 1807: Henry Christophe (b. 1767 - d. 1820)

President 17 Feb 1807 - 28 Mar 1811: Henry Christophe
King¹ 28 Mar 1811 - 8 Oct 1820: Henri I


Presidents 28 Dec 1806 - 27 Jan 1807: Henri Christophe (b. 1767 - d. 1820) (did not take office)

27 Jan 1807 - 10 Mar 1807: Bruno Blanchet (acting)
10 Mar 1807 - 9 Mar 1811 Anne-Alexandre Sabès, dit Pétion (b. 1770 - d. 1818) "Papa Bon Coeur" (Father Good Heart) (1st time)

9 Mar 1811 - 10 Mar 1811: Jean-Chrisostôme Imbert (1st time)(d. 1855) (acting)
10 Mar 1811 - 9 Mar 1815: Anne-Alexandre Sabès, dit Pétion (2nd time)
9 Mar 1815 - 10 Mar 1815: Jean-Chrisostôme Imbert (2nd time)(acting)

10 Mar 1815 - 29 Mar 1818: Anne-Alexandre Sabès, dit Pétion (3rd time)
29 Mar 1818 - 30 Mar 1818: Jean-Chrisostôme Imbert (3rd time)(acting)
30 Mar 1818 - 13 Mar 1843: Jean-Pierre Boyer-Bazelais (d. 1850)
13 Mar 1843 - 4 Apr 1843: Charles Hérard aîné, dit Rivière (d. 1850) (1st time) (Chief Executive)
4 Apr 1843 - 5 Apr 1843: Provisional Government
- José María Imbert
- Voltaire (d. 1843)
- Philippe Guerrier (d. 1845)
- N. Segrettier

5 Apr 1843 - 2 May 1844: Charles Hérard aîné, dit Riviére (2nd time) (Chief of Provisional Government to 4 Jan 1844)

Apr 1844 - 1844: Louis Jean-Jacques Acaau (d. 1846) (General, in charge of grievances; in rebellion)

3 May 1844 - 15 Apr 1845: Philippe Guerrier
15 Apr 1845 - 16 Apr 1845: Council of Secretaries of State
- Alexis Beaubrun Ardouin (b. 1796 - d. 1865)
- Jacques Sylvain Gelin Hyppolite (b. 1784 - d. 1857)
- Jean Paul (b. 1800 - d. 1872) - ....

16 Apr 1845 - 1 Mar 1846: Jean-Louis Pierrot, baron Pierrot (1857)
1 Mar 1846 - 27 Feb 1847: Jean-Baptiste Riché (d. 1847)
27 Feb 1847 - 1 Mar 1847: Council of Secretaries of State
- Charles Céligny Ardouin (d. 1849)
- Alexis Maurice Dupuy - .... - ....

1 Mar 1847 - 26 Aug 1849: Faustin Élie Soulouque
Emperor 26 Aug 1849 - 15 Jan 1859: Faustin I

15 Jan 1859 - 13 Mar 1867: Fabre Nicolas Geffrard (d. 1879) (President of the Revolutionary Committee [in rebellion from 23 Dec 1858] to 23 Jan 1859)

13 Mar 1867 - Mar 1867: Council of Secretaries of State
Mar 1867 - 20 Mar 1867 Consultative Council
20 Mar 1867 -2 May 1867: Jean Nicholas Nissage-Saget (d. 1880) (1st time) President of Provisional Government)
2 May 1867 - 4 May 1867: Provisional Government
- Jean Nicholas Nissage-Saget
- Victor Jean-Marie Eustache (b. 1815 - d. 1869) Chevallier, dit Victorin
- Sylvain Salnave (b. 1826 - d. 1870)

4 May 1867 - 27 Dec 1869: Sylvain Salnave (Protector of the Republic to 16 Jun 1867)

27 Dec 1869 - 13 May 1874: Jean Nicholas Nissage-Saget (2nd time) (President of Provisional Government to 20 Mar 1870)

13 May 1874 - 14 Jun 1874: Council of Secretaries of State
- Pierre Charles Barthélemy Denis, (b. 1822 - d. 1884) dit Darius Denis
- Désilus Lamour
- Justin Alexis Victor Turenne Carrié - et al.

14 Jun 1874 - 15 Apr 1876: Michel Domingue

15 Apr 1876 - 23 Apr 1876: Council of Secretaries of State
23 Apr 1876 - 17 Jul 1879: Pierre Théoma Boisrond-Canal (d. 1905) (1st time) (President of Provisional Government to 17 Jul 1876)

17 Jul 1879 - 26 Jul 1879: Central Committee of Public Safety
26 Jul 1879 - 2 Oct 1879 Joseph Lamothe (President of Provisional Government)

2 Oct 1879 - 10 Aug 1888: Louis Étienne Lysius Félicité Salomon, dit Lysius Salomon jeune,(President of Provisional Government to 26 Oct 1879)
27 Mar 1883 - 27 Oct 1883: Jean-Pierre Boyer-Bazelais (d. 1884) (chief executive of the Central Revolutionary Committee)

Aug 1888 -16 Oct 1888 Pierre Théoma Boisrond-Canal(2nd time) (President of Revolutionary Committee to 23 Aug 1888,
then President of Provisional Government)

16 Oct 1888 - 22 Aug 1889: François Denys Légitime (d. 1935)

22 Aug 1889 - 23 Aug 1889: Council of Secretaries of State 23 Aug 1889 - 17 Oct 1889 Monpoint jeune,(President of Provisional Government)

17 Oct 1889 - 24 Mar 1896: Louis Mondestin Florvil Hyppolite (d. 1896)

24 Mar 1896 - 31 Mar 1896: Council of Secretaries of State
- Tirésias Antoine Auguste Simon-Sam
- Jean Antoine Tancrède Auguste (d. 1913)
- Solon Ménos (d. 1918) - et al.

31 Mar 1896 - 12 May 1902: Tirésias Antoine Auguste Simon-Sam
12 May 1902 - 26 May 1902: Central Committee of Public Welfare
26 May 1902 - 17 Dec 1902 Pierre Théoma Boisrond-Canal (3rd time) (President of Provisional Government)

4 Aug 1902 - 15 Oct 1902: Joseph Anténor Firmin (President of the Executive Council; in rebellion)

17 Dec 1902 - 2 Dec 1908: Pierre Nord Alexis (b. 1820 - d. 1910) (Head of Executive Power to 23 Dec 1902)

2 Dec 1908 - 5 Dec 1908: Public Order Commission
- Louis-Auguste Boisrond-Canal (b. 1847 - d. 1940) - et al.

6 Dec 1908 - 3 Aug 1911: François C. Antoine "A.T." Simon (d. 1923) (Head of Executive Power to 21 Dec 1908)

24 Jul 1911 - 8 Aug 1912: Jean-Jacques Dessalines Michel Cincinnatus Leconte (Supreme Chief of the Revolution to 7 Aug 1911; Head of Executive Power 7-14 Aug 1911)

8 Aug 1912: Council of Secretaries
- Edmond Lespinasse (1st time)
- Antoine Constantin Sansaricq (b. 1868 - d. 1941)
- Jacques Nicolas Léger (1st time) (b. 1859 - d. 1918)
- John Déjoie Laroche (b. 1861 - d. 1921)
- Tertulien Guilbaud (1st time) (b. 1856 - d. 1937)

8 Aug 1912 - 3 May 1913: Jean Antoine Tancrède Auguste
3 May 1913 - 12 May 1913: Council of Secretaries
- F. Baufossé Laroche (b. 1865 - d. 1921)
- Seymour Pradel (b. 1876 - d. 1943)
- Jacques Nicolas Léger (2nd time)
- Tertulien Guilbaud (2nd time)
- Edmond Lespinasse (2nd time)
- A. Guatimosin Boco

12 May 1913 - 27 Jan 1914: Michel Oreste Lafontant, dit Michel-Oreste
27 Jan 1914 - 2. Jan 1914: Council of Secretaries
2. Jan 1914 - 8 Feb 1914 Edmond Sylvestre Polynice (1st time) (chairman Committee of Public Welfare)

8 Feb 1914 - 29 Oct 1914: Emmanuel Oreste Zamor (d. 1915)
29 Oct 1914 - 6 Nov 1914: Edmond Sylvestre Polynice 2nd time) (chairman Committee of Public Welfare)

6 Nov 1914 - 22 Feb 1915: Joseph Davilmar Théodore (d. 1917) (Head of Executive Power to 10 Nov 1914)

22 Feb 1915 - 2. Feb 1915: Committee of Public Welfare
- Seymour Pradel
- Edmond Sylvestre Polynice

2. Feb 1915 - 25 Feb 1915: Committee of Administration
25 Feb 1915 - 28 Jul 1915: Jean Vilbrun Guillaume Sam (d. 1915) (Head of Executive Power to 9 Mar 1915)

28 Jul 1915 - 11 Aug 1915: Revolutionary Committee
- Charles de Delva
- Edmond Sylvestre Polynice
- Diogène Dèlinois
- Charles Zamor (d. 1931)
- Gaston Dalencourt
- Ermane Robin

12 Aug 1915 - 15 May 1922: Philippe Sudre Dartiguenave (d. 1926)
15 May 1922 - 15 May 1930: Eustache Antoine François Joseph Louis Borno
15 May 1930 - 18 Nov 1930: Louis Eugène Roy (d. 1938)
18 Nov 1930 - 15 May 1941: Sténio Joseph Vincent (d. 1959)
15 May 1941 - 11 Jan 1946: Élie Lescot (d. 1974)
11 Jan 1946 - 16 Aug 1946: Franck Lavaud (1st time) (chairman Military Executive Committee)

16 Aug 1946 - 10 May 1950: Dumarsais Estimé (d. 1953)
10 May 1950 - 6 Dec 1950: Franck Lavaud (2nd time) (chairman Government Junta)

6 Dec 1950 - 12 Dec 1956: Paul Eugène Magloire (d. 2001) (Head of Executive Power from 6 Dec 1956)
12 Dec 1956 - 4 Feb 1957: Joseph Nemours Pierre-Louis (provisional)

7 Feb 1957 - 1 Apr 1957: Franck Sylvain (provisional) (d. 1987)
1 Apr 1957 - 6 Apr 1957: Léon Cantave (1st time) (d. 1967) (Army Chief of General Staff)
6 Apr 1957 - 20 May 1957: Executive Government Council
- Léonce M. Bernard (d. 1984)
- Georges Bretous
- Stuart Cambronne
- Antoine Pierre-Paul (to 24 Apr 1957)
- Ti Vilfort Beauvoir (to 24 Apr 1957)
- Weber Michaud
Seymour Lamothe
- Raoul Fabre Daguilh
- Théodore A. Nicoleau (to 24 Apr 1957)
- Ernest B. Danache
- Emmanuel Bruny
- Max Bolté
- Grégoire Eugène (b. 1924)

20 May 1957 - 25 May 1957: Léon Cantave (2nd time) (Army Chief of General Staff)
25 May 1957 - 14 Jun 1957: Pierre Eustache Daniel Fignolé (d. 1986)MOP (provisional)

14 Jun 1957 - 22 Oct 1957: Antonio Thrasybule Kébreau (d. 1963) (chairman Military Council)
22 Oct 1957 - 21 Apr 1971: François Duvalier "Papa Doc" (d. 1971)PUN/Non-party (chief of the revolution 15 - 22 May 1963)
21 Apr 1971 - 6 Feb 1986: Jean-Claude Duvalier "Baby Doc" (b. 1951)

6 Feb 1986 - 7 Feb 1988: Henri Namphy (1st time) (b. 1932) (chairman National Council)
7 Feb 1988 - 20 Jun 1988: Leslie François Manigat (b. 1930) RDNP
20 Jun 1988 - 17 Sep 1988: Henri Namphy (2nd time)
17 Sep 1988 - 10 Mar 1990: Prosper Avril (b. 1937)
10 Mar 1990 - 13 Mar 1990: Hérard Abraham (interim) (b. 1940)
13 Mar 1990 - 7 Jan 1991: Ertha Pascal-Trouillot (f) (b. 1943) (provisional)

7 Jan 1991: (hours) Roger Lafontant (provisional) (b. 1931? - d. 1991)

7 Jan 1991 - 7 Feb 1991: Ertha Pascal-Trouillot (f) 2nd time
(provisional)
7 Feb 1991 - 30 Sep 1991: Jean-Bertrand Aristide² (1st time) (b. 1953) FNCD
1 Oct 1991 - 8 Oct 1991: Raoul Cédras (b. 1949) (leader of military junta)

8 Oct 1991 - 19 Jun 1992: Joseph C. Nérette (provisional) (b. 1924)

19 Jun 1992 - 15 Jun 1993: Marc Bazin (acting) (b. 1932) MIDH

15 Jun 1993 - 12 May 1994: Jean-Bertrand Aristide (2nd time) OPL-Lavalas Lavalas (in exile, but recognized in Haiti)
12 May 1994 - 12 Oct 1994: Émile Jonassaint (provisional) (b. 1913 - d. 1995)
12 Oct 1994 - 7 Feb 1996: Jean-Bertrand Aristide (3rd time) OPL-Lavalas
7 Feb 1996 - 7 Feb 2001: René Garcia Préval (1st time) (b. 1943) OPL
7 Feb 2001 - 29 Feb 2004: Jean-Bertrand Aristide (4th time) FL

29 Feb 2004 - 14 May 2006: Boniface Alexandre (provisional) (b. 1936) 14 May 2006: - René Garcia Préval (2nd time) PL

JustimaBlogspot Open University: Lessons to be learned toward understanding The Big Neighbor The US in Haiti and in the Caribbean Basin

The Caribbean Basin
by Robert A. Pastor*

Scholars of inter-American relations have devoted considerable efforts to try to locate the motive for U.S. involvement in the internal affairs of its neighbors. Instead of a single answer, they have amassed a collection of explanations that range from security (keep out rivals, maintain stability), political/ideological (promote democracy, prevent Communism or "alien" ideologies), economic (imperialism, access to investment or trade), to psychological (an impulse to dominate, a fear of insecurity, misperception). A particular explanation might be cogent for a case, but in trying to understand what moves the United States over time, one needs to look for patterns in the history of U.S. relations with the region.

One pattern is the way in which U.S. attention to the region has fluctuated between obsession and disinterest. I have referred to this pattern as a "whirlpool,"[1] a whirling eddy, which occasionally sucks the United States into a vortex of crisis where it becomes preoccupied by small neighbors or their leaders. U.S. presidents react to these crises with security, political, and economic programs that have their historical antecedents even if the policymakers of the time are not aware of them. Then, almost as suddenly, U.S. interest and resources shift away from the region, and many Americans can hardly recall either their nemesis or the reason for their intervention. Americans then feel they have escaped the whirlpool, but history suggests that they are on the rim, only to be pulled into the vortex with the next crisis.

Although the history of U.S. relations with the Caribbean Basin is replete with examples of America's drive to extract resources, uproot "alien" ideologies, implant a political philosophy, or prescribe an economic orthodoxy, this whirlpool pattern suggests that the dominant motive over time has been U.S. security. The United States has been motivated not so much to control the region but to keep things from veering out of control where they could be exploited by others viewed as hostile. The line separating a policy of control and a need to keep things from veering out of control is not always easy to locate, but the moment to look would be after the passing of a crisis. If the U.S. motive was to control the nation, it would retain a military presence after the crisis; if the U.S. wanted just to keep rivals out, then it would withdraw after the crisis, as it has usually done in the Caribbean Basin.

The nations in the Caribbean Basin are too small and poor to merit an acquisitive policy or to constitute a direct threat to the United States; the threat that has moved the United States was that more powerful adversaries from Europe or Asia could forge a relationship with a small nation that would permit it to be used as a base to attack or harass the United States or its neighbors. When the threat diminishes, U.S. interest diminishes. That accounts for the apparent cycle between preoccupation at moments of intense geopolitical rivalry and neglect at times of geopolitical calm.

The end of the Cold War raises, once again, the question as to whether the United States has escaped the whirlpool of unproductive relations or whether it is just at its rim. Interest in the region has declined, but is it permanent? That question can only be addressed satisfactorily after we review the history of U.S. policy toward the Caribbean Basin and examine the changes that have occurred in the last two decades.

A Survey Of U.S. PolicyU.S. foreign policy toward the Caribbean Basin has been the sum of the answers to questions as to whether the United States ought to have a "special relationship" with the region and what that means; questions of how to preclude instability, discourage foreign penetration, defeat anti-American revolutionaries, promote peaceful political change, foment economic development, defend human rights, reinforce democracy, gain respect for U.S. investment, the American flag, and U.S. citizens, and maintain good relations with our neighbors. Answers to these questions have differed from one administration to the next, and particularly when there is a change in the party in power. But the differences have never been as much as the administration claims at its beginning, nor as little as it suggests when its power is waning or its policy is wanting, and it seeks strength by asserting continuity or bipartisanship. Nonetheless, in identifying the threads of continuity that have tied presidents as different as Carter and Reagan, one can better appreciate the elusive concept, "national interest." In discerning the changes in policy toward similar problems, we might better establish the boundaries of real choice.

In the twentieth century, U.S. foreign policy toward the Caribbean Basin can be divided into four periods: (1) the protectorate era, 1898-1933; (2) the Good Neighbor Policy, 1933-1953; (3) the Cold War, 1953-1990; and (4) the post-Cold War era.

The Protectorate Era
The United States has always been of two minds--realistic and idealistic--on how to relate to the Caribbean Basin. It has aimed to prevent foreign rivals from getting a foothold, but it has also sought ways to embody its idealism in policy. The tension between these two sides was captured in two Congressional amendments passed within three years of the other. The Teller Amendment to the Declaration of War against Spain in 1898 declared that the United States would not annex Cuba, the main prize of the war. In an age of imperialism, this was an unusual act of self-denial, and some leaders, notably Theodore Roosevelt, took pride in the amendment as proof that U.S. motives were different and purer than those of Europe.

The Platt Amendment was passed in 1901 to grant the United States rights to intervene in Cuba's internal affairs to protect lives and property and preserve Cuban independence. This amendment not only appears self-contradictory--how can U.S. intervention preserve Cuban independence?--but it also appears to negate the Teller Amendment. In actuality, the amendments represented the two sides of the American perspective on Cuba and, more broadly, the Caribbean area. The United States wanted Cuba to be free, but it feared that too much freedom could cause instability and foreign--i.e., non-U.S.--intervention, and so it imposed limits.

Those limits were enunciated in President Theodore Roosevelt's "Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine," a message to Congress in December 1904. Roosevelt wrote that "chronic wrongdoing, or an impotence which results in a general loosening of ties of civilized society . . . may force the United States, however, reluctantly . . . to the exercise of an international police power." Just three years before, Roosevelt allowed three European governments to intervene to collect debts from Venezuela provided no territory was acquired. His position changed for three reasons: the American public reacted very negatively to the European bombing of a fellow American republic; in 1903, the United States signed a treaty to build a Canal in Panama; and in 1904, the country with a debt problem was the Dominican Republic--a lot closer than Venezuela--and the Germans were the ones that wanted to collect the debt.

The construction of the Panama Canal--with an investment equivalent to one-third of the U.S. budget in 1914--was a sign of U.S. expansion and a motive for widening its arc of defense. U.S. presidents became preoccupied with protecting this strategic asset from the region's instability and other foreign powers--to the extent that some historians referred to our entire policy toward the Caribbean Basin as "the Panama policy."[2]

Still, there were many different ways to defend the Panama Canal and U.S. interests in Latin America during the 20th century. Theodore Roosevelt and Elihu Root, his secretary of state, tried to preclude revolution by international treaties. William Howard Taft used Marines, dollars, and customs receiverships to help the countries remain solvent and stable. Woodrow Wilson replaced "dollar diplomacy" with the promotion of liberty but, like his predecessors, he continued to use the Marines. During the protectorate period, U.S. Marines intervened more than 20 times in the Caribbean area--repeatedly in Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Panama, Nicaragua, and Mexico.

On the eve of the First World War, U.S. fears of German activities in the region intensified. On July 29, 1915, President Wilson ordered U.S. Marines to occupy Haiti. "Though it [the United States] did not need and it did not want such a coaling station [in Haiti], it could not permit a European government to secure one," wrote a former secretary of state to a Senate committee investigating the intervention. "The indications were that Germany intended to obtain one unless she was prevented from doing so by the United States."[3]

In 1916, the United States occupied the Dominican Republic, and on March 8, 1917, one month before the United States declared war against Germany, American forces intervened again to prevent civil war in Cuba. The stated cause of these interventions was instability in each country, and the purpose was to promote democracy, but the sense of urgency in the United States related more to events in Europe than in the Caribbean.
If the Spanish-American War heralded the arrival of the United States as the preeminent power in the Caribbean Basin, then the end of the First World War signaled that the United States had become the leading power in the world. The European powers, preoccupied with their own recovery, withdrew or sharply reduced their already limited economic and diplomatic presence in the Caribbean Basin. No power stood in the way of the United States. Realist theories would argue that the United States would maintain and expand its presence in the region and around the world, but the opposite happened. The U.S. Senate rejected involvement in the international institutions that Woodrow Wilson helped construct, and the 1920 election confirmed an America yearning for "normalcy" and isolation. The United States also disengaged gradually from the Caribbean, although this was also due to interventions in the region proving more costly and less effective.

Just as the interventions tended to follow a similar pattern so too did the exits. The Marines first helped establish an "apolitical" military guard. Then, with some difficulty and military assistance, U.S. diplomats supervised elections that legitimized a government. Most U.S. diplomats recognized the shallowness of the new "democracies" and the threats that the new armies might try to seize power, but Washington decided to withdraw the Marines, and with one momentary reversal--in Nicaragua in 1925--U.S. soldiers went home, beginning in 1921 and ending in 1934.
The Good Neighbor PolicyIn an article in Foreign Affairs in 1928, Franklin D. Roosevelt criticized the interventions of the previous decades: "By what right . . . other than the right of main force, does the United States arrogate unto itself the privilege of intervening alone in the internal affairs of another sovereign Republic? . . . Single-handed intervention by us in the internal affairs of other nations must end."[4] Elected president four years later, Roosevelt used his inaugural address to repeat his promise to Latin America to dismantle the old protectorate system and replace it with a new "good neighbor" policy.

In practice, Roosevelt's policy had three components.[5] First, he pledged non-intervention in the internal affairs of Latin America. He withdrew the Marines from the remaining countries in which they were still based and repealed the dreaded Platt Treaties. Although Secretary of State Cordell Hull's statement on non-intervention at the Montevideo Conference is often cited as the beginning of the policy, the real test was passed by Hull and Roosevelt in 1933 when they rejected at three different times the recommendation of U.S. Ambassador to Havana Sumner Welles to land Marines in Cuba, allegedly to protect American citizens, but really to control political events.[6] One of the consequences of accepting the principle of non-intervention, however, was that it removed the principal impediment--the United States--from the path to power by military dictators like Anastasio Somoza of Nicaragua, Fulgencio Batista of Cuba, and Rafael Trujillo of the Dominican Republic.

The second element of the policy was freer trade by Reciprocal Trade Agreements. As Congressman and Senator, Cordell Hull had been a vigorous advocate for free trade for many years, and he gave it highest priority when appointed secretary of state. With much of the world divided into trading blocs, the one region with the most countries eligible for such agreements was Latin America, and, as a result, by 1945, 16 of the 22 bilateral trade agreements signed by the United States were with hemispheric governments.

The third element of the Good Neighbor Policy was a systematic effort by the United States to consult with its Latin neighbors. Even before the storm clouds of war gathered over Europe, Roosevelt and Hull took the inter-American conferences seriously. The investment paid off when war began. Except Argentina, the region gave virtually complete support to U.S. war aims.

After Roosevelt died and the war ended, the broad outlines of the Good Neighbor Policy were maintained by President Harry Truman. Truman made a few changes, e.g., experimenting briefly with a more active policy to promote democracy and distance the United States from dictators. The Truman administration also took the lead in establishing a collective security structure, first in the Rio Pact of 1947, and the next year with the Pact of Bogota that established the Organization of American States (OAS). These institutions formalized the consultative process that Roosevelt and Hull had pursued in the pre-war period.

The Cold War
While some U.S. government officials were concerned about the spread of Communism in Latin America in the 1940s, the first serious intrusion of the Cold War occurred in Guatemala where the Eisenhower administration covertly tried to unseat the leftist Arbenz government in June 1954. As a colonel in the army, Jacobo Arbenz and several of his colleagues overthrew dictator Jorge Ubico in 1944. A free election brought Juan Jose Arevalo to power as president, and he undertook a program of reforms that unsettled the conservative establishment in the country. Arbenz was elected in 1951, and with the support of the Communist Party, he accelerated reforms into ever more sensitive areas, including the inequitable land tenure system.

The Truman administration was worried about Communist influence, and at one time the president had approved a covert plan coordinated by United Fruit Company officials to overthrow Arbenz. When Secretary of State Dean Acheson learned of the plan, however, he convinced Truman to drop it. The Eisenhower administration pursued a more vigorous anti-Communist posture both at home and abroad, and its officials saw the threat more seriously than its predecessor. The U.S. ambassador urged Arbenz to dismiss Communist party members from his government. A proud nationalist, who was dependent on the leftists for ideas and political support, Arbenz refused.[7] The United States imposed an embargo on arms sales to the regime, and when a shipment of arms sailing to Guatemala from Eastern Europe was discovered, Eisenhower authorized a covert plan to overthrow Arbenz. The plan failed, but it catalyzed the Guatemalan military, already suspicious and alienated from the president, to take action against him.

The coup's significance was the message it conveyed across Latin America that the United States would not tolerate leftists--even if they came to power by free election--and that it would work closely with right-wing dictators like Somoza in order to stop Communism. This had the unfortunate effect of reducing the political space for democrats, encouraging leftists to revolt, and rightists to suppress any dissent.
Fidel Castro learned another lesson from Guatemala, one that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director Allen Dulles did not grasp until the failure of the Bay of Pigs. After coming to power, Castro replaced the military with his own guerrilla army. Within a year, the U.S. government began a program aimed at overthrowing or assassinating Castro. These failed, and Castro consolidated power.

Nonetheless, the fear of "more Cubas" led President Eisenhower and then Kennedy to propose "Marshall Plan-type" schemes to facilitate the region's development. After resisting the idea of international commodity agreements and the establishment of the Inter-American Development Bank, Eisenhower finally accepted both in his last year in office. Kennedy's bold ten-year, $10 billion foreign aid program to Latin America, the Alliance for Progress, was aimed to foster development, support social and land reforms, and reinforce democracy. While it did not achieve its high expectations, it did energize the region in important ways.

The fear of Communism also led President Kennedy to pursue projects begun in the last year of the Eisenhower administration to try to remove dictators who were near Cuba and felt to be vulnerable to Cuban-backed insurgencies. In Haiti, "Papa Doc" Duvalier outlasted President Kennedy. In the Dominican Republic, CIA-supported conspirators assassinated Rafael Trujillo in May 1961. Within a year, an election was held, but the new President Juan Bosch was overthrown seven months later. In April 1965, civil war broke out as Bosch's followers tried to retake power. President Johnson sent 22,000 soldiers. While the Dominican Republic did not become another Cuba, most scholars of the intervention conclude that this was never likely; the only outcome with a high probability was that U.S. intervention would severely damage U.S. relations with Latin America, as it did.[8]

Within a year of the intervention, and for more than a decade, American attention was diverted away from the Caribbean to war in Vietnam and the Middle East, and detente with the Soviet Union. By 1977, however, the United States could no longer ignore the resentment in Panama over obsolete Canal treaties, and Jimmy Carter took the unpopular decision of revising those treaties and modernizing U.S. relations with that small country.[9] Carter also reoriented U.S. relations with the third world to place a high priority on human rights. The policy impelled dictators to release thousands of political prisoners in Haiti, Cuba, and elsewhere, and helped consolidate democracy in the Dominican Republic. An attempt to engage the Cuban government made some progress, particularly in the release of 3,000 political prisoners, but Cuba's expansionist ambitions in Africa precluded any further progress in the relationship.

The Carter administration also sought to fill the security vacuum that opened as the British departed the Caribbean. Beginning in 1962 and continuing through the 1980s, twelve small English-speaking islands or territories in or on the Caribbean became independent. The new nations were vulnerable, and Carter responded by launching the Caribbean Group for Cooperation in Economic Development under the auspices of the World Bank. The Caribbean Group was composed of 30 nations and 15 international institutions, and within four years it quadrupled the aid given to the region and coordinated it to encourage integration.
Nonetheless, a leftist coup occurred in 1979, almost by accident, in the small, English-speaking country of Grenada. The National Security Council met the day after the coup and decided to reinforce Grenada's uneasy neighbors. When Great Britain and the other islands decided to recognize the new regime based on its pledge to hold early and free elections, the United States accepted their approach, but decided to keep a watchful eye on the regime.[10] Relations soon deteriorated because the regime did not keep its pledge and imported arms covertly from Cuba, but the Carter policy aimed to help Grenada's neighbors rather than to try to undermine or overthrow the regime.

The Carter administration anticipated the revolution in Nicaragua, but, despite considerable efforts, failed to prevent it. The Sandinista guerrillas were viewed by the administration as Marxists and anti-American, but the Somoza regime was indefensible and, indeed, was viewed as the cause of the problem. Therefore, the Carter administration first tried to liberalize the regime; then it mediated differences with the opposition under an OAS multilateral umbrella. When Somoza rejected the mediation, the Carter administration imposed sanctions.
The Sandinistas enjoyed widespread support throughout Latin America, and when the United States in June 1979 tried to gain agreements in the OAS to depose Somoza but interpose an inter-American peace force, most of the Latin American leaders accepted the first and rejected the second. Carter decided not to act alone, and the Sandinistas took power on July 20, 1979. The United States then worked with its friends in the region to provide aid to the Sandinista regime in the hope of moderating it. This strategy showed mixed results until the fall of 1980 when the Sandinistas decided to ignore warnings from Washington and support the leftist insurgency in El Salvador. When this was discovered in the last days of the Carter administration, the United States suspended economic aid to the regime.[11]

The Nicaraguan and Grenadian revolutions were joined in the minds of some Americans with the Iranian revolution and the taking of American diplomats as hostages, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the Soviet-Cuban intervention in Ethiopia. These events increased America's frustration, and no one articulated the apprehension better than Ronald Reagan in the 1980 campaign.

The change in policies toward the Caribbean Basin from Carter to Reagan was as dramatic a shift as the United States had seen between two presidents in the twentieth century. While the Carter administration started with an interest in promoting economic development in the Caribbean but eventually returned to a concern for national security, the Reagan administration, reflecting a more traditional approach, made the same journey in the opposite direction. But this understates the different points of departure of the two presidents.

The Carter administration placed a high priority on multilateral approaches to security problems and respecting the sovereignty of small nations. President Reagan believed that the East-West struggle was paramount, and the small nations were important only to the extent that they were allies or enemies in this wider struggle. Reagan viewed "instability [as] being inflicted on some countries in the Caribbean by Cuba and the Soviet Union." As he told the Wall Street Journal in 1980: "The Soviet Union underlies all the unrest that is going on. If they weren't engaged in this game of dominoes, there wouldn't be any hot spots in the world."

Reagan adopted a very confrontational approach to Grenada, and in October 1983, when one faction of the revolutionary government attacked another, he joined with six Caribbean nations to invade the island, arrest the revolutionaries, and restore a democratic government to power. The centerpiece of his East-West strategy in the region was his support for the Salvadoran government and the Nicaraguan contras. As with President Kennedy, however, Reagan was sensitive to criticism that his anti-Communist strategy lacked a positive component, and so he fashioned a development program, the Caribbean Basin Initiative, and institutions, such as the National Endowment for Democracy, to promote democracy.

George Bush adopted a less ideological and belligerent approach than his predecessor. The Bipartisan Accord, negotiated by Secretary of State James A. Baker and Speaker of the House Jim Wright stopped military aid to the contras long enough to permit real negotiations to move forward. With the support of the Central American presidents, and the active mediation of the OAS, the United Nations (U.N.), and the Council of Freely Elected Heads of Government, chaired by former U.S. President Carter, Nicaragua held a free election in February 1990, which foreclosed the contra war and permitted the first peaceful transfer of power in Nicaragua from an incumbent to his adversary in the country's history.
The Post-Cold War EpochIn the Caribbean Basin, no conflict was solved automatically as a result of the implosion of the Soviet Union. The Nicaraguan conflict was resolved because the U.S. Congress rejected military aid to the contras, the Arias Plan provided a framework for negotiations, and Carter, the OAS, and the U.N. mediated a crucial election. The Salvadoran conflict was resolved because of U.N. mediation with U.S. support. But the Guatemalan and Colombian conflicts continued long after the Soviet Union disappeared, and Cuba used all of its energies to survive.

Although there was no longer a Soviet security threat in the hemisphere, the Bush administration intervened in Panama in 1989, and the Clinton administration intervened in Haiti in 1994.

General Manuel Antonio Noriega had been an ally of the Reagan administration in its war against the Sandinistas in Nicaragua, but in June 1987 a senior Panamanian military officer accused Noriega of killing a political leader, manipulating the 1984 election, and being deeply involved in drug-trafficking. President Reagan suspended aid and imposed sanctions. In the summer of 1988 the Reagan administration negotiated Noriega's departure, but it retreated from a deal because George Bush's previous association with Noriega was a political liability in an election year.

In May 1989, former President Carter observed the elections and denounced Noriega when he tried to manipulate them. The OAS foreign ministers then met and condemned Noriega's actions and tried unsuccessfully to negotiate his departure. In October 1989, the Bush administration hesitated to support a group of rebel officers who tried to seize power from General Noriega because of uncertainty as to the identity and goals of the coup plotters. Bush's failure to act proved an embarrassment, however, and so when a second opportunity presented itself in mid-December, the Bush administration decided to take advantage of it by intervening on December 20, 1989. There were three goals: to arrest Noriega and bring him to justice in the United States; to protect U.S. citizens (some of whom had been attacked by the Panamanian military); and to restore democracy. All three goals were achieved, but as the first unilateral military intervention in Latin America in 65 years, the invasion in Panama was roundly condemned in the OAS and the U.N., and, significantly, its impact was felt as far as Moscow. When Secretary of State James A. Baker visited the Soviet Parliament two months later, a Latvian Deputy told him:
"I don't want to speak about the norms that the United States violated in Panama, but . . . you must have weighed the positive and the negative in taking these decisions. I would like to inform you of one negative aspect that you did not take into account.

In this country, we also have our hawks and doves, and the actions of the United States in Panama provided additional arguments to our hawks, especially after the Summit Meeting in Malta left the impression that our relations had undergone a qualitative change, and then all of a sudden your intervention in Panama happened. There is no question that this will complicate our Parliament's consideration of our proposal to proceed along the road of disarmament."[12] The circumstances surrounding the question of intervention in Haiti had a few points of similarity but many more differences with the other post-Cold War case. As in Panama, the precipitating issue concerned the legitimacy of the government. In December 1990, after numerous false starts, and in the presence of large numbers of observers from Carter's Council, the OAS, and the U.N., Haiti held a successful election in which Jean-Bertrand Aristide won by a large margin. On September 30, 1991, the military overthrew him and sent him into exile.

The OAS condemned the coup and recommended an embargo and diplomatic isolation. Jamaican Prime Minister Michael Manley told Secretary Baker that the Caribbean would support a military effort to restore Aristide. After stemming the flow of refugees, however, and in the midst of a presidential election in which his lack of attention to domestic issues was a liability, President Bush decided to put the Haiti issue aside.
During the presidential campaign, Bill Clinton criticized President George Bush for repatriating the Haitian refugees, but after the November election, Clinton was persuaded to maintain the same policy, fearing that a change could unleash a flood of new refugees. At the same time, he earned Aristide's support for the policy by promising that he would use all his influence to assure Aristide's return to power. This promise was apparently made without consideration of its consequences and, as a result, U.S. rhetorical support for Aristide's return was not supported by U.S. actions. In October 1993, a U.S. ship bringing U.N. security forces to the island was not permitted to land in Port-au-Prince, and the embarrassment of turning the ship around compelled the Clinton administration to consider military action. The president, however, decided against it then.

In July 1994, the U.N. Security Council passed a Resolution permitting the use of force by member states to ensure Haitian military compliance with past U.N. resolutions calling for the restoration of constitutional government. On September 15, President Clinton warned the Haitian military leaders to step down from power immediately. Although he announced that all diplomatic options were exhausted, none had been explored in the previous six months, and, at the last minute, he asked former President Carter, Senator Sam Nunn, and General Colin Powell to negotiate the departure of the Haitian military leaders.

The Carter team succeeded in gaining the agreement of the provisional government for the entry into Haiti of a large multinational force led by the United States. On September 19, the day after the agreement was signed, 20,000 U.S. forces arrived to create a secure climate that would permit the restoration of President Aristide and the consolidation of democracy in Haiti.

Patterns of Intervention and Non-Intervention

Let us review seven cases of U.S. intervention in the Caribbean Basin in the post-World War II period (see Table 1).
Table 1

Case: Not to Intervene- Intervene Indirectly -Invade
1. Guatemala 1951 1954- No
2. Cuba 1958 1960, - 1961 - 1962
3. Dominican Republic 1960, 1961- 1965
4. Nicaragua 1979 1981- 1987
5. Grenada 1979, 1981- 1983
6. Panama Oct. 1989 - Dec.1989
7. Haiti Dec.91, Oct. 93- 1915, Sept. 94, Fev. 04

Jan.94. Jul.94

To understand the key patterns, one needs first to distinguish between direct intervention by U.S. forces and indirect intervention by supporting local or third-country forces. Secondly, one wants to distinguish between the decision to intervene and the decision not to intervene.

The question of what motivated U.S. policymakers to intervene in the Cold War period yields an unsurprising answer--fear of the spread of Communism. Legitimate questions can be raised as to whether the fear was justified in particular cases, whether the response was appropriate, and whether other concerns, e.g., business interests or democracy, were also important. But an intensive analysis of the five Cold War cases suggests that U.S. policymakers acted to prevent the spread of

Communist influence.
There are two more interesting questions, however, than the one of motives during the Cold War. First, what were the reasons for not intervening during the Cold War?; and second, what were the motives for intervention in the post-Cold War period?

Table 1 probably omits many moments in the post-war period when the president's advisors broached the issue of intervention, and the president rejected that option. The decisions that we know the president made not to intervene occurred in crises in Guatemala in 1951, Cuba in 1958, Nicaragua in 1979, and Grenada in 1979 and 1981. As one looks at the broader sweep of U.S. foreign policy, the differences between Democratic and Republican approaches seem less significant. Democratic presidents chose not to intervene in Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Grenada; Republican Presidents chose not to intervene in Cuba in 1958 and Grenada in 1981. A similar pattern holds for the decision to intervene.
In the cases of non-intervention, the level of perceived threat was quite low, and there was little public awareness of the crisis. The president evidently believed that it would be difficult for him to justify military intervention. In each of these cases, the "enemies" did not describe themselves as Marxists or Communists, but they were "leftists." Moreover, the countries were small, and far bigger crises were preoccupying the United States at the time. In the case of Nicaragua, President Carter knew that his Latin American allies would strongly oppose intervention against the Sandinistas as they were supporting them at the time. In the other cases, the principal constraint was simply the president's conscience and the American body politic.

The fact that the issue of intervention was broached made it easier for the president to consider indirect--and in a few cases, direct--intervention the next time. This was particularly true in the three most recent cases.
The business of identifying a single motive to a complicated national decision is not an easy assignment. In the Panamanian case during the post-Cold War era, in December 1989, the United States had interests in maintaining an open Panama Canal, protecting American citizens, and restoring democracy, but the Canal was not endangered, and there is reason to believe that American citizens would be threatened more by the invasion than without. Certainly, the personal embarrassment felt by President Bush because of his previous associations with Noriega was a contributing factor.

In the case of Haiti, the United States was initially motivated by a fear of refugees. When this concern was alleviated, the pressure to intervene diminished. Over time, however, President Clinton built multilateral support for intervention, and although he did not favor this option initially, he almost left himself no other option at the end. Still, the decision to forge an international coalition to restore democracy in Haiti was an unprecedented contribution to the construction of a collective defense of democracy.

An additional reason for both interventions was presidential credibility and fear of embarrassment. Both Bush and Clinton had pledged to rid themselves of the problem and a previous effort (in Panama, in October 1989; and in Haiti, in October 1993) had failed. Their credibility was at stake.

The factor of presidential credibility was also important during the Cold War. In the case of Grenada, the interesting question is not: why did President Reagan invade in 1983?; but rather why he did not invade in 1981. There was never any doubt that a U.S. invasion of that small island would be no more difficult than the takeover of Martha's Vineyard. But in 1981, a U.S. invasion would have been condemned by everyone, including Grenada's closest neighbors. In 1983, the execution of several Grenadian political leaders so repulsed the democratic leaders of the region that they changed their implicit veto of U.S. actions into an invitation. Still, the decision for the United States to invade needed other reasons. Although the U.S. medical students were in no danger of becoming hostages, some in the administration feared that could happen. Half-way across the world, the suicide bombing of the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut provided a need to show that the United States could "stand tall" again.

Perhaps the motive is less important than the consequence of intervention--both for the country and the international community. In both cases, the post-Cold War intervention was positive in terms of improving the lives of the vast majority of the people of Panama and Haiti. The two interventions had different effects on international law and the wider community. In the case of Panama, the intervention was condemned as a unilateral violation of international law; in the case of Haiti, the intervention contributed to a broadening of international law as it had been sanctioned by U.N. Resolution.

The Ebbs and Flows of the Whirlpool: Defining Ends and Means The process by which the United States Government makes the decision to intervene or not to intervene had been restricted generally to the president and his closest advisors in the confines of the National Security Council. Congress and public opinion are important to the decision, but in a very indirect manner. The president must calculate the effect of his decisions on Congress and the American people, but he rarely consults with more than a handful of Senators or Congressmen.

The decision of whether to go to war is one of those that sit on one end of the spectrum of Executive-Legislative decisionmaking. At the other end are amendments to the foreign aid law where Congress has primary responsibility, and the president is often on the edges trying to find a niche to influence the outcome.

During the 20th century, U.S. policies toward the Caribbean Basin have been anchored to a set of interests which have changed much less than the strategies formulated to pursue them. The motive for U.S. engagement sometimes has been altruistic--to promote democracy or development--but more often it has been fear, a disproportionate fear for such a large power in such a small sea, but a fear nonetheless that events could turn hostile to U.S. interests. It follows that American foreign policy in the Caribbean always has seemed to err on the anxious side. In the 19th century, the United States was anxious to prevent "another Haiti," an independent black republic. In the early 20th century, the United States was anxious to prevent governments in the region from defaulting to European creditors lest that be used as a pretext for European intervention. During the Second World War, the United States was anxious to keep out Nazi Germany, and after that, Soviet Russia. After the Soviets turned up 90 miles offshore, the United States became anxious to avoid "another Cuba."

Beyond this elemental security interest, the United States has also tried, at different times, to promote human rights, democracy, social reforms, and economic development. U.S. national interests are not immutable; they have changed over time, sometimes so slowly as to not be perceptible. For example, the Panama Canal is no longer a vital asset to the United States, although it remains vital for Panama. With the advent of aircraft carriers, which are too large to transit the canal, U.S. interests in the canal changed from being strategic to being primarily economic--from permitting the U.S. fleet to move rapidly between oceans to providing a marginal economic advantage in the shipment of supplies.
U.S. interests do not change radically from one administration to the next, but the value and priority that each administration attaches to these interests often changes quite markedly. Both Carter and Reagan, for example, promoted U.S. interests in human rights, but Carter gave a much higher priority than did Reagan. Both wanted to prevent Communist inroads in the hemisphere, but Reagan saw the threat as so dire that he was willing to support armies that committed atrocities.
Franklin D. Roosevelt, Harry Truman, and Jimmy Carter pledged non-intervention and meant it. Dwight D. Eisenhower, John F. Kennedy, Lyndon Johnson, Richard Nixon, Ronald Reagan, and George Bush violated their pledges of non-intervention because they perceived serious threats to U.S. security. Kennedy, Carter, Reagan, and Bush all proposed development programs in the area, although none had enough of an impact to lift the region up to the level of sustainable development.
Presidents defined U.S. interests differently; they also chose different means to defend them. Carter and Bush were more willing to consider multilateral approaches than Reagan, while Bush and Reagan gave more emphasis to military aid, invasions, and covert actions than Carter.
Opening Spheres of InfluenceWhere colonialism or imperialism were not options, major powers have asserted "spheres of influence"--areas of vital interest where sovereignty was grudgingly recognized, deviant behavior was proscribed, and other powers were unwelcome. When respected, such spheres reduced confrontations between major powers; conflict was not necessarily diminished, but it was contained within and among small nations.

Winston Churchill and Joseph Stalin thought Franklin Roosevelt's vision of a world order without spheres of influence was quixotic. Privately, the two of them negotiated quotas of influence in Eastern Europe. Since the late 1940s, both the Soviet Union and the United States rejected each other's right to a sphere, even while asserting its own rights. Stalin secured his sphere in Eastern Europe. The United States secured its sphere in Latin America by negotiating the Rio Pact in 1947, by establishing the OAS in 1948, and, later, by covert actions.
U.S. critics noted the contradiction, if not the hypocrisy, between condemning Soviet control of Eastern Europe and asserting it in the western hemisphere, but only after Gorbachev could a Russian citizen match this self-criticism and write: "We rejected the concept of a division of spheres of influence in `theory' yet pursued it in practice."[14] The Brezhnev Doctrine, which asserted the right of the Soviet Union to compel its neighbors to remain Communist regardless of their preferences, made the Monroe Doctrine seem modest in comparison.
The Soviets were acutely sensitive to the slightest diminution of their control in Eastern Europe; the United States allowed more space for internal change but drew a line to preclude Marxist governments in Latin America. The hotter the Cold War, the more determined each superpower became to avoid any encroachments.
By letting Eastern Europe go its own way ("the Sinatra doctrine"), Gorbachev opened the door to the most profound, peaceful transformations in the postwar period. Within one year, free elections brought democratic, non-Communist governments to power in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and East Germany. Though the people in each of these countries had deep-seated anti-Soviet fears, which had been one of the reasons why Gorbachev's predecessors had been so loath to let go, the new governments were less anti-Soviet than his predecessors had expected.

A similar dynamic was at work in Central America. After a decade of U.S.-supported war in Nicaragua, the Sandinistas and many others thought their best political assets were the U.S.-backed contras, nationalism, and anti-Americanism. But the Nicaraguan people voted overwhelmingly for Violeta de Chamorro in part because they expected her to improve relations with the United States.

This is not to suggest that nationalism and anti-Americanism are spent forces in Latin America. Hardly. The new wave of democrats in the region have been pragmatists, but the next wave might very well be nationalists. Much depends on whether the current generation succeeds and how the United States responds. The history of U.S. relations with Latin America can be viewed as a grudging acceptance by the United States of the region's autonomy and a gradual recognition by Latin Americans that they were partly responsible for their own division and for inviting foreign intervention. The Cold War was just the most recent episode. U.S.-Russian cooperation has stopped exacerbating the region's conflicts, but these can only be resolved locally. The long-standing connection between civil war and foreign intervention will always be a danger in a region of small, open, vulnerable nations so close to the world's most powerful until definitive steps are taken to sever that tie.
In September 1989, Eduard Shevardnadze, then Soviet foreign minister, outlined a world without spheres in a speech to the U.N.:

"It is no secret that we were not enthusiastic about the election setback of the Polish Communists. . . . Nevertheless, we see nothing threatening in the fact that in accordance with the will of the Polish people a coalition government has been formed . . . Tolerance is the norm of civilized behavior. But if it is
obligatory for us in our attitude toward the Government of Poland, why are others so intolerant toward, for example, Cuba? . . . The days of traditional demarcation lines are numbered."

[15] The Soviet Union long trailed behind the United States in its lack of respect for self-determination on its periphery. In denying that his country had any moral or political right to interfere in the affairs of its East European neighbors, however, Gorbachev leaped far ahead of the United States. Before Gorbachev's daring move, President Bush took two steps backwards, stating his intention to help "the Soviets understand that we have very special interests in this hemisphere, particularly in Central America, and . . . I don't think they really have substantive interests in this part of the world, certainly none that rival ours."[16]
Like the aftermath of the first and second world wars, the end of the Cold War provides an opportunity for the international community to build new institutions and invigorate old ones. The aim should be to develop rules that restrain unilateral intervention but strengthen collective responsibility and action on behalf of peace and democracy. If the rules can secure each nation from outside intervention or inside subversion, then instability would no longer become a cause for tension by outside powers. Rather it would trigger collective mediation and action.
The heavy, negative weight of the Cold War has been lifted. But the hemisphere won't escape the whirlpool until it understands that the central dilemma was not a function of the East-West conflict; more than anything, it was due to the chronic instability and vulnerability of the small nations of the region. If a group felt that its access to power was blocked, it would almost always seek support from outside. In the Caribbean, that meant either the United States or, if it were already supporting the government, then its enemy. Thus, internal strife was connected to international intervention.

Many condemned Washington, Moscow, or Havana for this predicament, but the real culprit was the absence of a framework for securing peaceful political change and the lack of resources to help nations improve the lives of their people. The way to untie the gordian knot connecting internal conflict with international intervention is by forging a new collective defense of democracy within a broader arrangement that will assist the process of development and the pursuit of social justice.
If governments in the region do not realize they are currently on the rim of the whirlpool, then they will find themselves recaptured someday. If they develop a strategy to preserve democracy and sustain development, then they can escape to a truly new world.

[*]Robert A. Pastor is a professor of political science at Emory University, and director of the Latin American and Caribbean Program at The Carter Center. He was director of Latin American affairs on the National Security Council from 1977-1981.

[1] Robert A. Pastor, Whirlpool: U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Latin America and the Caribbean, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992. [2] Samuel Flagg Bemis, The Latin American Policy of the United States, New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1943, pp. 185-89.
[3] Letter from Robert Lansing, former secretary of state, to Senator Medill McCormick, chairman of the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Haiti and Santo Domingo, May 4, 1922, in James W. Gantenbein, ed., The Evolution of Our Latin American Policy: A Documentary Record, New York: Octagon Books, 1971, p. 636.
[4] Franklin D. Roosevelt, "Our Foreign Policy: A Democratic View," Foreign Affairs, July 6, 1928, pp. 584-85.
[5] See Irwin F. Gellman, Good Neighbor Diplomacy: United States Policies in Latin America, 1933-1945, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979; and Bryce Wood, The Making of the Good Neighbor Policy, New York: Columbia University Press, 1961.
[6] For an excellent account of U.S. policy toward Cuba when Welles was ambassador, see Bryce Wood, The Making of The Good Neighbor Policy, New York: Columbia University Press, 1961, Chapters 2 and 3.
[7] The literature on the Guatemalan revolution is diverse in interpretation. The best recent book that incorporates much of the evidence of the previous works is by Piero Gleijeses, Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution and the United States, 1944-1954, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991.
[8] See Abraham F. Lowenthal, The Dominican Intervention, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972.
[9] For an analysis of the Carter, Reagan, and Bush administrations, see Robert A. Pastor, Whirlpool: U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Latin America and the Caribbean, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992, Chapters 3-5.
[10] For a full description of U.S. policy and U.S.-Grenadian relations during the Carter and Reagan administrations, see Chapter 8 of my book, Whirlpool: U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Latin America and the Caribbean.
[11] For a full development of U.S.-Nicaraguan relations, see my Condemned to Repetition: The United States and Nicaragua, Princeton University Press, 1987.
[12] Quoted in Thomas Friedman, "Baker Braves the Gauntlet in the Moscow Parliament," New York Times, February 11, 1990, p. 20.
[13] During the Missile Crisis, the Kennedy administration made a tentative decision to invade Cuba if the quarantine failed.
[14] Andrey V. Kozyrev, "What Soviet Foreign Policy Went Sour," New York Times, January 7, 1989, p. 17.
[15] Excerpts in New York Times, September 27, 1989.
[16] "President's News Conference," reprinted in New York Times, February 7, 1989, p. 34.

Who is Justima?

Justima, after discussions, posing with a Political Strategist in the US who is close to members of the US Congress and of the City Council of NY.


Who is Justima? Read Justima's Profile: http://www.blogger.com/profile/08397038063916519371
Biographical Notes

1- Justima is a co-founder of the St Gérard Technical Center. Along with his father Justin who was a high ranking official of the lay roman catholic organization “la Sainte Sainte Famille d’Haïti’’ (Holy Family of Haïti), they started the St Gerard Technical Center with the pastor of the roman catholic parish of St Gerard, the Belgian father Joseph Classens. Justima is the one who first equipped and the first who directed the studies and training at this vocational center in one of the most populous neighborhood of Port-au-Prince, the one of Carrefour-Feuilles. This experiment in the heart of a disadvantaged neighborhood has worked and today the St Gerard Technical Center is one of the most important private technical schools and vocational centers of the country.


2- Justima is a former journalist and former radio and TV news star anchor. He coordinated the first team of Radio Antilles International around 1984-1985, a leading news station of the Port-au-Prince Metropolitan area. That team included at the time Major Carrel Occil who became Lieutenant Colonel of the Armed Forces of Haiti and Military Commander of the North of the country.This has been twenty years now since he is no longer at Tele-Haïti, the only private cable TV station of Haiti. But the memories of his grand screen presence, that he was telegenic, his reassuring and captivating voice and diction and tone, the quality of news anchor he was, the fact that he was one of the most sought after and most intelligent and master of critical one-on-one interviews, are elements that are still in the minds of Haiti’s TV viewers. It is through that televised platform that the Haitian ‘bourgeois’ got to know him and how he got to know them.

Editor in chief and acting news director of the state-owned national radio in 1987 and during three months only, he gave to that national radio its first newsroom code, which was a first in any media in Haiti. Former member of the board of directors of the first Haitian Association of Journalists (AJH) after the departure of President Duvalier in 1986-1987, he was elected the same year at Caracas in Venezuela by his peers Latin-American journalists, Executive Secretary of the FELATRAP (Federacion Latino Americana de Trabajadores de Prensa). Subsequently, he was awarded the prize of best speaker and news anchor by the National Society of Professional Journalists of Alix Damour, and also the prize of most prestigious host of a political program on TV. He has presented numerous conferences and lectures on Haïti throughout the world, including in Aruba in 1987, in Singapore and Hong-Kong in 1995, etc. It is from his demonstration in the medias of his capacity to debate the great and burning questions of the day with the best leaders of the political class, that the middle and the intellectual class started considering him, as of 1986, as one of the most striking burgeoning flowers of the Haitian intelligentsia.

3- Justima, born in an average middle class family, has succeeded economically while still placing himself at the service of others. He was born on February 21, 1966 in the Isaïe Jeanty Maternity Hospital of Chancerelles in now the geographical communal division of the world famous popular slum of Cité Soleil. His friends and intimates tease him about a parallel they say they see between him and the national independence hero Francois Cappoix called « Cappoix la mort », who was born in 1776 and who himself turned forty in 1806. Justima, indeed, born exactly 200 years later turn forty in February 2006. His intimates who tease him, do so out of appreciation for his staunch and unwavering courage to dare face and confront his motherland’s Haiti secular challenges and problems that date 200 years that everyone is running away from because of their enormity and of the too real possibility to fail. Justima’s response: “M renmen peyi m” (i.e. I am in love with my country). It is said that Justima is a man who operates on a high mystical and spiritual plane field but who is quite humble for someone of his high level of intelligence placed at above 149 in 1999 and measured by his psychologist following a head injury resulting from a car accident the fist day of the year.

He went to school somewhat late compared to the children of his age; he was almost 7 years old. He skipped kindergarten and went straight to first grade. Due to his performance, they made him skip many grades at the primary school level to make up for his late start. He repeats often “It is on the knees on my mother Marie Céline that I have learned to read and write.” He calls his mother ‘Madame ma mère’ when he speaks of her and she would gladly tell you “Emmanuel never dares raise his voice on me”. The relationship with his mother, who has 8 other children, is one of a special, abiding and enduring love between the two that is even the envy of his siblings. He was fourteen, he was reading in front of a crowd of several thousands. He was the one who generally did the readings for the “Holy Family of Haiti”, a once influential lay Roman Catholic organization. That’s what gave him the springboard and impetus to jump to public life as a matter of Christian conscience and responsibility of an engaged faith. This exposure to great assembly of Christians is the reason why he is so used to and comfortable with large crowd.

He is a product of the national schools in Haiti, managed by mostly religious orders established in Haiti and supported by public funds. He completed his primary level schooling at the national school called after the late Pope John XXIII, a school located on the Boulevard of the once world famous bayfront “Bicentenaire” (built for Port-au-Prince Bicentennial). This school is managed by the Sacred Heart Friars on behalf of the state. These friars are also responsible for his secondary level schooling completed at the private College Canado-Haitian where he is still among the most famous alumni who ever wore the uniform.

Wanting to be grateful and to give back for the almost completely free primary schooling he received from the national school system, Justima attempted in 2001 to introduce, in various towns of Haiti, a program of assistance and of complete reinventing of the primary school system of the nation to meet Haiti today’s needs tomorrow’s demands. To that effect, he started the program “The children of la Relève”. La relève means the ones that will ensure succession and progression; taking over the baton and taking it further. This program pushed by a citizen movement for ‘la relève’ in our education system and in our classrooms, tried to meet the following objectives throughout the country, starting in 2000-2001 at Port-de-Paix, one of the most economically disadvantaged sections of the country:1) To change the nature and to raise the sub-standard and sub-optimal level of the education taught in our schools by concentrating on five key basic blocks of learning; a) concentrating on sciences, b) concentrating on mathematics, c) concentrating on languages, d) concentrating on history, including case studies of the history of commerce, of economic, industrial and social progress in Haiti and around the world, e) concentrating on social education to grow a new kind of citizenry and make up for parents who either are not up to par or are too busy and absent, and finally to reverse the free falling of moral values in the land.2) To raise the performance of teachers by a vast movement of mass retraining of all who teaches in Haiti regardless of the level, and to raise the level of performance of everyone who goes to school in Haiti so as to cause that each student is graded on average at a minimum c level, thus averaging out 70 out of 100 in each of the 5 concentrations areas. That would be a dramatic shift up in the capability curve and the academic performance of the nation since the official passing grade is now at a low 50 out of 100. Justima repeats often “You will continue to have a sub par and sub-standard country if you continue with a sub par education. We should even shoot for higher than the 70 out 100 passing grade of the US because we are the ones who are 200 years behind and who need to play catch up”.3) To introduce in each of these classrooms, modern teaching aids and didactic materials, including computers, that facilitate quick and compressed learning experiences; all in a preferably renovated and air-conditioned classroom.4) To raise the salary of these teachers associated with the program.5) To subsidize the parents to help them pay for their children school tuitions and to subsidize the administrations of these schools to help pay for electricity bills, telephones, internet access, and to help provide a daily nutritious hot meals to each child.

4- Justima, a natural visionary leader, cited in several books, periodicals and newspapers articles, is quite probably among the best communicators (almost in the same league with the popular President Aristide) and among the best specialists of social marketing of his country. He is one who resonates, with his gifted communication skills, with the average Haitian almost in the same way Aristide did. When he talks, he captivates Haitians. So, often, he is given the task to talk to the nation in difficult situations, such as reassuring the nation about the first CEP (the electoral board) of 1987 and launching the Notre Dame University project of Haiti’s Catholic Conference of Bishops in 1995, convincing Haitians to give money for the project in a country that was just trying to emerge in the aftermath of a devastating embargo imposed on Haiti.Viter Juste, the columnist of the Haitian weekly « Haïti en Marche », who is known for his perspicacity and rigor and accuracy in his remarks, wrote about Justima in the October 17, 2001 issue of ‘Haïti en marche”:

“It is indeed our sense and our opinion that the actual political class in Haiti,with may be a few rare exceptions, is incapable of resolving the problems of the country because this current classhas accumulated too much hatred. It is not ready to concede anything or to arrive at any compromise to save the nation that is dying. The many dinosaurs that form the so called opposition are incapable of producing an alternative governing plan. Their entire plan of government consists of a mountain of intrigues inassociation with the traditional enemies of the people. Therefore, who can blame those who think within themselves that all this political class should be put in a recycle box while Emmanuel Justima is claiming aloud that there is a team of young adults formed abroad in all the requisite disciplines that is ready totake over, to ensure la ‘relève’, that is to ensure succession, continuation and progression. Is it a crime against the nation to demand that a complete overhaul be ordered both withinthe ranks of the government and of the opposition? There are a lot of people who share Mr. Justima’s thinking. Mr. Emmanuel Justima, if you are able to join your deeds with your words, get to work, before the bark of the state collapses in these whitewaters of chaos, taking with it in its demise, thegovernment, the opposition, and the nation.”

Justima Emmanuel who found himself, at the end of 2003, as an active ordinary simple citizen, at the head of a multi-sector national group—which was trying to reframe the bicentennial commemoration of 2004 of Haiti’s 200 years of independence, in the midst of a political turmoil, in order to make these commemorations more personal and more meaningful to each citizen—is also the one who founded and launched HaitiCorps, in May 2000. It is this corps which is a more adaptive version of the US Peace Corps, that a lot of people of Haitian descent used to contribute money to reputable charitable organizations in the United States, in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 tragedy in the support of the American people under chock. It is this corps which was developing 49 teams of collective and cooperative capability of simple ordinary citizens in 49 provinces of the country that mutated itself as the head of the spear of a National Movement of Simple Citizens, that became the backbone of the political regrouping “Action Démocratique” which sent Justima as its Presidential candidate to the February 7, 2006 Presidential elections, out of disgust for what happened on the day of January 1, 2004, out of impatience, out of duty.

Within the Haitian State and in addition to the national public radio station, Justima was a consultant and adviser to the top management at OFTAMA, the state-owned office of Workers’ Compensation Insurance and Disability and Maternity Leave. At the first electoral board in Haitian history put together in Haiti in 1987, he was more than just the simple deputy director of public relations, he was the first national spokesperson of the CEP— the Provisional Electoral Council— who had to balance on a daily basis the newly established CEP role and prerogatives with the government traditional turf.

In the business world, Justima made himself a reputation as a virtuoso of financial products marketing in the United States, working even as an adviser to top management of top financial services companies. He subsequently created his own firm in 1994, which is known in Haiti since 1995, mostly for having successfully promoted and launched the Notre Dame University of Haiti Project under a contract with Haiti’s National Conference of Catholic Bishops.

Justima has also acquired valuable experience in the industrial manufacturing area, having piloted complex projects of reorganization and of planned change, having developed participative and empowering employees processes within various companies, having raised employees ‘bellcurve’ capabilities, and having systematized work models to cause teams’ productivity and performance yield to grow. Lately, he is interested at a clinical approach of the many conditions that lower someone’s performance. He is the author of an unpublished doctoral dissertation on leaders and their performance as an agent of transformation. He is preparing also a book on Leadership in Haiti.

5- Justima studied Leadership and Change Introduction in Washington D.C. It is in the heart of the US federal capital at the world-class George Washington University that Justima completed his doctoral studies of Education and Leadership in Human Development. It is there he solidly grounded and academically anchored his know-how of a leadership approach of “maximum cooperation minimum tension”; a neuro-cognitive and psycho-technical approach of change introduction in many contexts of anaclitic depression such as Haiti, where groups of people who are already pugnacious and quarrelsome, panic when they have to change. He has also completed a Master’s of Science in Industrial management, hence his rational, technical, productive, pragmatic, pro-growth approach but in industrial quality and quantity.

Justima is a very mainstream Haitian who is still stuck to his modest roots like many successful people of his generation, the likes of the Haitian world's Megastar Whycleff Jean, who are not trying to be what they are not and separate themselves from “le peuple” as they say in Haiti but instead who reach back to lift some. Justima is more a citizen patriot and statesman for his times and not a career politician. He has created and made a business and made a payroll which is a rare event for traditional practitioners of politics. He is a born business man at heart and is the CEO of the JHJ, the diversified Justima, Holdings and Justima company which he had to shut down temporarily many years before the 2006 elections, victim of the current chaotic political situation of the country and which was totally abandoned for another sort of world player enterprise, JUSTIMA'GILL and its JPLI companies in the US and in Europe, via some strategic partnerships.

6- Justima is extremely qualified in the eyes of his fellow compatriots. Since 1995, he supported countless schools and financed a lot of school cafeterias. Out of his own funds, he repeatedly paid for hundred of school tuitions, helped hundred pay their rents, their medical bills, paid for funerals or weddings. But even so, it is none of that that qualifies him in the eyes of the average Haitian. What qualifies him is the very deep spirit of (re-)construction, i.e. of renewal and of restoration of his country from cursed to blessed that animates him. It is that deep divine push and pull from inward to find purpose in his life that has laid the vision of a Haiti.2 over a 25-30 year span into his heart and it is that important and powerfully attractive vision of a new Haïtianna, a new version of Haiti that operates at a higher level, that he champions and is trying to exemplify. That is what qualifies him. It is the multiple work and field studies that is has been conducting now for more than 10 years to draft that vision of Haiti.2 into 21 integrated plans of interrelated rapid development and transformation of 49 geographic areas of Haiti in 21 domains; that’s what separates him from the rest in the eyes of his compatriots. He comes ready and prepared for the nation’s top job, rather than talking without a plan. And more importantly, he finds a way in his plans to get every willing Haitian and able body in the country to get involved as a co-constructor and an executor in one of the 21 areas upon which the future is being built, regardless of age, sex, political affiliation or social class and specially to get involved the great masses shut down of the making of a country since 1804 and being forced to remain with the same shrinking slice of the national pie.Justima says “the country belongs to all of us. We are all his co-heirs and co-owners by virtue of the deeds and ultimate sacrifices consented by the great forefather and foremother of each of us. We each have the right, in practice not just in theory, to be its co-constructors and co-determinators and to live of its dividends from our fair share.”

Furthermore, Justima’s policy is :
" a) value every available human asset of the country, we have no Haitians to waste, we are not even enough to tackle the great many tasks of country-building which we must tackle and operate on, at once and simultaneously, to get any traction;

b) by necessity, call on also all Haitians abroad and on all people of Haitian descent worldwide and make them co-partners of the effort and co-partners of the profit and lead them back to the motherland as the great army of “retournés” (the ones that have returned home);

c) by necessity, call on all people of skills and of all nationalities worldwide and specially all skilled and influential and wealthy black and mulatto of the Caribbean, of the US, of Africa and of the rest of the world, make them make Haiti, as expatriates, the newest great land of opportunity in the Americas like Dubai and Shanghai are in the Far east.” Turn them into adoptive naturalized Haitians also so they can fully reap what they helped us sow.

That’s Justima’strategic agenda of "grafting" in order to add on quickly the skilled, experienced people and the billions Haiti currently does not have to lift millions struggling Haitians at a time. Justima gets it. That is what qualifies him. He has that unique plan to increase quickly and massively our absorptive capacity if we are to reach our goal of massive, rapid industrialization, technical advancement and sophistication of services for the massive and rapid advancement of our population. This is why he is a President-in-waiting and that so many in Haiti, noticeably among former President's Aristide backers, and so many around the world (who took notice of his likability and electability among young men and women of the urban areas and urban masses, and among the peasants of the country side who feel elevated in his 48 more communities other than Port-au-Prince message), have started putting together "Friends Backers of Justima" committees to push him all the way.

7- Justima, who has never lost an election, in which he seriously and fully competed when he is backed by the full array of resources and organization necessary, is perceived as the new blood and as the fresh face of the Haiti of tomorrow. He has something about him of fresh vision and of clear soul and a different kind of charisma which makes you lower your defenses to put yourself at ease to want his leadership, to trust his judgment and work with him. You see him as the man of great synthesis who constantly searches to simplify the complex, and as the man whose loyalty never fails. This is why in many instances, he has been entrusted with the leadership in situations in which there was the need to be imaginative, to come up with something different, to force and defy the odds at every step and to put it all together in a final product in which every one would recognize himself and herself and would have a fair stake in the outcome. He is a more deeply spiritual than religious man who prays a lot daily before doing anything, a family man who will become one day in the eyes of many the most attractive and polished Haitian president, since 1986 of the Duvalier post-era, with the look and the appropriate gravitas and stature for that. Since primary school to secondary school, he has been regularly either selected or elected president of his class, which is a tell tell sign. Justima is one of the three main initiators and founders of the 11 political parties caucus called “ The Block Alternative”, one of the 4 main political block of Haiti along side with the Lavalas offsprings, and the two competing Haitian convention and National Council of political parties.

Justima has started a foundation_Fondation Justima For Democracy and Pilote Development_firstly, to give the masses a breather when it comes to the spiraling costs of food and daily basic necessities, and secondly to pick 3 domains or areas of intervention in Haiti in which he can start showing Haitians and the world, concretely and on the ground, what physical transformation in each of these 3 areas and what life-altering, life-transforming solutions, innovations and changes he can achieve that lead to mass advancement of the people in these areas. Thirdly and lastly, his foundation joins the leading ranks of those promoting public policies in favor of social and economic justices, in favor of intelligent but profitable stewardship of the environment, and in favor of real and definitive fix of the conditions of poverty and underdevelopment.

Justima, called affectionately either “PDG” or “President Tima” by his intimates, is a man who adores make people laugh and he is a father of two.

By Friends Backing Justima/Par Les Amis qui Poussent Justima

HAITI.2@live.com